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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background of the Problem 
A distinct shortage of food, with sharp increases in its prices in 
the year 1974, and the persisting high prices in subsequent years emitted 
a warning signal to all nations of the globe that the era of abundant cheap 
food may not be the same again. High grain prices following the drought 
and the fivefold price rise invoked by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting countries (OPEC) gave rise to high food costs and inflation to 
consumers everywhere, and rising death rates to the world's poorest for 
whom sharp increases in food prices inevitably meant starvation [30]. 
The effect of population growth, resource supplies and prices, and 
natural calamities contribute to the severity of a particular world food 
crisis. The set of proper and prompt actions which can be taken by the 
members of the so-called Spaceship Earth to reduce the destructive action 
of these factors is a major concern. 
1. Population explosion 
The rapid growth of population in the less-developed world and the 
incapability of many of these countries to produce enough food for the 
growing population increases the vulnerability of these countries to food 
shortages. According to Youde and Carter: 
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The world population, currently estimated at about four 
billion, is growing at a rate of 2 percent per year. There 
appears to be little chance of much drop in that average rate 
by 1985. In the developed world, the problem appears to be 
manageable; but in Asia, Latin America and Africa, growth 
rates remain excessively high. The problem is particularly 
serious in Asia, where population density is already high. 
Statistically speaking, world population is projected to 
increase by another one or two billion from 1985 to 2000. At 
the upper population variant, this means feeding about twice 
as many people in 2000 as existed in 1968. At the lower 
variant, the world population in 2000 would still be 50 
percent greater than it is today [36]. 
Forty years ago the developing world was a net exporter of food. 
Today, these same regions are substantial net importers, accounting for 
37 percent of all imports of food moving in international trade. The 
significantly higher rates of population growth in this group of coun­
tries (2.4 percent as compared to 1.0 percent in the developed world) 
are mostly responsible for the decline in per capita food availability 
of the world [22]. 
2. The OPEC cartel 
The monopolistic power exercised by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) worsens the world food problem. The subse­
quent high prices of oil and many of its products, namely, gasoline, 
fertilizers and insecticides which are major farm inputs depress food 
supply and hence, increase the world's supply-demand imbalance of food. 
Energy, like land and water, is part of the basic inputs crucial to world­
wide food production. The energy shortages and price increases of 1973-
1975 emit a warning signal of the high cost of obtaining not only food 
but other commodities as well. The Green Revolution, which has been 
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successfully carried out in many parts of the world, is also hindered 
to a great extent by this suppressing action of the OPEC cartel. 
3. Natural calamities and depleted 
world food stocks 
Natural disaster is a great barrier to man's effort to be self-
sufficient in food production. Among all the possible destructive forces 
of nature, flood and drought are the two leading forces affecting the 
world's food supply. Historically, these two forces have been repeatedly 
recorded in countries all over the world. The following examples are 
from a report of the Economic and Social Commission of the United Nations 
on a variety of natural disasters that have taken place in Asian countries 
[10]. 
Prior to the occurrence of several big earthquakes 
that hit Mindanao of the Philippines in June, 1976, typhoon 
damage was recorded in May of the same year. Drought 
conditions that followed affected rice planting in northern 
Luzon Province with a loss of 13,000 hectares predicted out 
of the total 44,000 hectares of rice. 
Only three years after the rice shortage brought about 
by the 1972-1973 drought, the 1975-1976 rice production in 
Thailand found yet a nationwide drought that was believed 
to dry out as much as 3.0 million tons of the country's 
paddy production. 
Malaysian imports of rice were expected to grow in 1977 
owing to drought which had affected west coast rice-producing 
areas of the nation. As a result, the main season planting 
was inevitably delayed. 
Next to Mindanao in the Philippines, Bali of Indonesia 
was also hit by big earthquakes in July, 1976. The same 
drought which affected crop production in Thailand also 
blotted out considerable crop production in Indonesia. 
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The effects of natural disasters on world food supply would have 
been less had the countries of the world maintained larger food reserves. 
The United States, whose food surplus had served as the world's principal 
food reserve following World War II and during the drought years of the 
mid-1960s and 1972, was caught without enough food reserves in 1974 and 
could no longer protect the world from the crisis [18]. 
By spring of 1975, the world, with its depleted food stocks, was 
believed to be more vulnerable to draught and bad weather than any time 
since World War II. A 2-3 percent shortfall in supply could send prices 
and death rates skyrocketing again [18]. 
B. The World Food Reserves 
Though it is believed that the world food shortages will continue 
to be centered in the developing regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
the problem is, nevertheless, worldwide. Effects of people suffering 
and unrest in the developing regions will inevitably be felt elsewhere. 
Without substantial cooperation of the developed nations, solutions to 
the world's food problems will not be easy to come by. 
In view of this, a World Food Conference was proposed in 1974 by 
the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. At the end of 
the 12-day session in Rome, 19 resolutions were adopted. One resolution 
called for the establishment of an international system of grain reserves 
[7]. For this system of international grain reserves. Grant 
estimated an equivalent of 50 days of world consumption in the stocks of 
the principal exporting countries either in the form of reserved grain 
stock or in idled cropland [18]. 
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The 36-nation World Food Council in Manila on June 20, 1977, also 
called for the establishment of a world food reserves system by 1985 to 
prevent the recurrence of the future global food crisis of 1972-1974 and 
stave off famine. 
As to the international rice reserves, conflicts between rice-importing 
and rice-exporting countries do exist and are subject to hard debate. 
The United States with its Public Law 480 program has for several years 
served as the world's major supplier of cheap rice to poor countries. 
What the United States really needs, however, is a couple of good crop 
years so that its rice reserves can be piled up for further use in the 
critical years. This Public Law 480 program of the United States, on 
the other hand, is considered by some groups to have a negative effect 
in that it discourages production efficiency and, hence, rice reserves 
in both the recipient countries and the developing rice-exporting coun­
tries, whose major foreign exchange earnings are from rice exports. 
Undoubtedly, there is ample opportunity for the world to increase its 
food production. But besides the need for better use of advanced tech­
nology, better farm management, and improved marketing and storage; effec­
tive incentives for the farmers are also critical. 
Stunned by the stagnancy of the world's effort to establish a system 
of global food reserves, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), in its Fourth Economic Ministers meeting in June, 1977, endorsed 
the desirability of all member countries to establish the region's own 
food security reserve system, particularly in the case of rice [3]. 
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C. The Association of South East 
Asian Nations 
Following the fall of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) due 
to conflicts over Sabah between Malaysia and the Philippines, the estab­
lishment of a new international association by the name of the Associa­
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was endorsed by foreign affairs 
ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thai­
land on August 8, 1966, in Bangkok. 
The objectives of ASEAN as spelled out in the Declaration of the 
ASEAN Concord [2] are as follows: 
1. The stability of each member state and the ASEAN region is an 
essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member 
state resolves to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN 
resilience. 
2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take 
active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, 
and Neutrality. 
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy is 
a primary concern of member states. They shall, therefore, intensify 
cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis 
on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living 
standard of their peoples. 
4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the 
pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within their 
capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress. 
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5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national 
and regional development programs, utilizing as far as possible the re­
sources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of 
their respective economies. 
6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely 
exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intraregional 
differences. 
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to 
create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation 
among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and 
mutual benefits. 
8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional 
identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, re­
spected by all, and respecting all nations on the basis of mutually 
advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of 
self-determination, sovereign equality and noninterference in the inter­
nal affairs of nations. 
ASEAN cooperation in the field of agriculture and agricultural 
development has been carried out through the Committee on Food, Agricul­
ture and Forestry (COFAF) of the ASEAN Economic Ministers. The workshop 
on the Study of Supply and Demand for Food and Other Strategic Commodi­
ties was one of the COFAF's efforts to solve the various facets of the 
regional food problems [4]. 
In February, 1978, the COFAF's working group on Food Security 
Reserves in Bangkok recommended the establishment of a system of ASEAN 
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rice security reserve, a periodic exchange of information on food supply 
situation and stock levels and the establishment of a special inter­
governmental body coordinated by Thailand [5]. These recommendations 
were later endorsed in the Third COFAF meeting in Jakarta. In addition. 
Professor Saedarsons Hadisapoeto, Indonesian Minister of Agriculture, 
also suggested that COFAF should initiate closer collaboration among the 
existing ASEAN committees as an essential element to the success of agri­
cultural development efforts [6]. 
As for products and trade, most ASEAN member countries are producers 
of primary commodities which include agricultural products and minerals 
[1]. Examples are rice, corn, cassava, sugarcane, coconut, oil palm, 
banana, pineapple, teak and lumbers, rubber, tin, iron, and nickel. 
Singapore is the only member country that produces mainly industrial com­
modities like petroleum products, electronic devices and transportation 
' f .  l' 
facilities. Its small islanff''*does not allow for productive agricultural 
outputs. 
The ASEAN countries trade with other countries all over the world. 
The region's export value in 1976 amounted to 25,145 million U.S. dollars, 
while in the same year it imported 26,013 million dollars worth of out­
side commodities, a deficit balance of 868 million U.S. dollars. Among 
the five ASEAN nations, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand encoun­
tered a trade deficit each year. 
Indonesia's major export items include crude oil and petroleum 
products, lumber, rubber, tin, oil palm, and coffee. In 1976, its 
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export value of crude oil and petroleum products amounted to 5,311 
million U.S. dollars while that of lumber was recorded at 500 million U.S. 
dollars. Indonesia's major imports are rice; fertilizers; mechanical 
equpment; vehicles; and products from crude oil, iron, and cement. 
Indonesia has experienced surplus trade balances every year since 1971-
The surplus of 1973 was 3,584 million U.S. dollars. 
Major export items of Malaysia mostly include rubber, tin, palm oil, 
timber and board, and petroleum. In 1975, Malaysia earned most of its 
foreign exchange from rubber and palm oil. Its import items are fuels, 
mechanical equipment transportation facilities, food, beverages, , 
tobacco, chemicals, and nonfood raw materials. In 1975, its import value 
for mechanical equipment amounted to 2,775 million Malaysian dollars. 
Food, beverages,and tobacco came next at 1,489 million. Like Indonesia, 
Malaysia experienced surplus trading balances every year during 1971-
1975. Its highest surplus balance was in 1977 at 1,438 million Malaysian 
dollars. 
The Philippines exports raw sugar, coconut oil, copper, timber and 
board, and copra. Its exported value of raw sugar in 1976 was 427 million 
U.S. dollars, with that of coconut oil coming second. The Philippines 
import items include fuel, machinery, metals, transportation equipment, 
and electrical equipment. Its import value for gasoline was highest in 
1976 at 891 million U.S. dollars. During 1970-1976, the Philippines 
experienced a deficit trade balance almost every year except 1973 when 
it had a surplus of 4,452 million U.S. dollars. 
10 
Singapore earns most of its foreign exchange from the trade of 
petroleum products (3,356 million Singapore dollars in 1965), raw rubber 
(3,356 million Singapore dollars in 1965), vegetable oils, clothings, 
and board. Its major import items are crude oil, petroleum products and 
machinery. Singapore's trade balance was negative every year between 1971-
1976. The deficit in 1976 was recorded at 6,512 million Singapore dollars. 
Thailand's major export items are rice, tapioca, sugar, maize, rubber, 
and tin. The export value of rice for Thailand in 1977 was 10,166 mil­
lion baht. Its major imports include petroleum and its products, chemi­
cals, electrical devices, paper, and dairy products. Thailand's trade 
balance has been in a deficit position for many years. 
For intraregional trade between Thailand and other ASEAN member 
countries, records showed that Thailand gained surplus trade balances 
over all of the others. Its major export items in the intra-ASEAN trade 
include rice, maize, kenaf, tapioca, seeds of some oil crops, manmade 
fibers, and machinery. Thailand's major imports from other ASEAN coun­
tries include gasoline and lubricants, coffee, chemicals, lumber, cork, 
tallow and vegetable oil, and dairy products. 
D. Overview of the Rice Economy 
Within the ASEAN Region 
Rice is a commodity which has a major economic and social impact 
on millions of people in the ASEAN region. It is the most important 
cereal produced and consumed in the region and also provides substantial 
foreign exchange earnings to the only rice-surplus country of the region, 
Thailand. 
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Of the five member countries of the ASEAN, Thailand is the second 
largest producer of rice, the country with the highest per capita produc­
tion (235.82 kilograms) and per capita consumption (195.10 kilograms), 
and the only net exporter of rice in the region. 
Indonesia produces more rice than Thailand every year but has less 
per capita production (88.29 kilograms). Its population is almost three 
times that of Thailand. Per capita rice consumption of Indonesians comes 
third (after those of the Thais and Malaysians (110.0 kilograms) among 
the ASEAN countries. Indonesia has consistently been a net importer of 
rice. 
Malaysia ranks fourth (among ASEAN countries) in total rice production 
but second in production per capita (93.59 kilograms) and in per capita 
consumption (127.26 kilograms). It exports some rice but imports more 
than it exports so that it is a net rice importer. 
The Phillippines is third in rice production, fourth in per capita 
production (82.31 kilograms), but last in per capita consumption (88.78 
kilograms). Wheat and corn are the other major staples consumed by the 
people of the Philippines. The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) 
has encouraged the Phillippines Green Revolution through development of 
many IR or high-yielding varieties of rice. In spite of such technological 
breakthroughs, natural calamities have been a great barrier to the Philip­
pines target of self-sufficiency in rice. Through 1977, the Philippines 
was a net importer of rice. 
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Singapore is the only nonproducer of rice within the ASEAN region. 
In fact, it is a trading nation which does not even have an agricultural 
ministry. Records, however, show exportation of rice from Singapore 
every year. It buys rice from rice-exporting countries for both 
re-export and for its own consumption. Singapore is one of the region's 
major rice consumers (with per capita rice consumption of 98.36 kilograms) 
and, hence, will remain a continual net importer of rice. 
E. Objectives of the Study 
The idea to establish food security for all people of the Earth in 
general, or for the people of a specified group like the ASEAN, brings 
with it the problems of how can such an idea be successfully car­
ried out. Whether bufferstocking or stockpiling is to be considered as 
the more appropriate means for a stocking arrangement for this purpose is 
yet to be decided. Of no less importance are the sizes and the location 
of the stocks, the rules and regulations governing accumulation and re­
lease of the stocks, cost-sharing mechanisms, and so on. 
To trace out possible relations between the sizes of a centrally-
located regional buffer stock of rice for all members of the ASEAN and 
the probability of meeting specified percentages of the ASEAN demand for 
rice is the major objective of this study. Other objectives include the 
study of the relationship between the chances to meet ASEAN rice demand 
and other variables of interest, namely, the size of Thailand's private 
stocks, buffer stock release percentage, and minimum export of Thai rice 
to countries outside the region. 
13 
In attaining these general objectives, the study has the following 
specific objectives: 
1. To estimate per capita demand for rice of each member country 
of the ASEAN by determining average 15-year (1961-1975) domestic dis­
appearance of each country. 
2. To estimate by econometric methods for each ASEAN country the 
rice production, net imports or exports between that country and Thailand, 
as well as the export of Thai rice to non-ASEAN markets. 
3. To use multivariate normal random variables (derived from the 
disturbance terms of all equations and the randomly drawn standard normal 
variates to provide realistic stochastic disturbance deviations between 
rice production, net imports of rice, and Thai rice exports to non-ASEAN 
countries. 
4. To develop computer programs which can be used to simulate rice 
security situations of a regionally-coordinated ASEAN rice reserve program 
operated under specified rules and regulations. 
5. To determine from the series of results obtained by computer 
simulation experiments those policy implications thought to be essential 
to a successful ASEAN rice security reserve program. 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
THE HYPOTHETICAL MODEL 
A. Stocking Arrangements for 
Agricultural Products 
The concept of a stocking arrangement for agricultural products 
calls to mind the ancient biblical story of Joseph and the Pharoah of 
Egypt, Four thousand years ago, the Pharoah was disturbed 
by a succession of dreams which none of his astrologers and wise men 
could interpret. One of the dreams was about seven fat cattle which were 
later killed and eaten by seven other lean ones. Another was about seven 
fat ears of corn and seven lean. Joseph, the slave, was the only 
person who could give a satisfactory interpretation of the dream to the 
Pharoah. According to Joseph, the seven fat cattle and seven fat ears 
of corn represented seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine 
so severe that they could blot out the memory of the time of abundance. 
Joseph further advised the Pharoah to store up grain during the surplus 
period so the people would have enough grain for consumption during the 
years of shortage. This storing activity was then successfully followed 
for hundreds of years. 
The general objective of a country's price stabilization program 
also is adapted from the biblical concept of Joseph's program to store 
the surplus for use during the deficit years. The excess over average 
weather crops is removed from the market and put into storage to be re­
leased back to the market in short crop years. 
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Given the quantity, Q^, supplied from an average weather crop and 
the equilibrium price, P^, a good weather crop which increases supply 
to Qg would, cetarls paribus, drive down the price to P^ (Figure 1). 
Likewise, a bad weather crop which reduces supply to would send the 
price up to P^. If, however, the excess over average weather crop of 
Qg - Qq could be removed out of the market and released back into the 
market whenever bad weather depresses supply to a level less than Q^, 
prices during such years of variation in production would be stabilized 
to some extent. The excess supply of a crop which is stored during the 
surplus year and released back to the market during the deficit year is 
generally termed "buffer stock" or "year-to-year storage" of the crop in 
question. 
Prices 
P 
" Quantity 
Figure 1. The working of a storage program 
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Another facet of stocking arrangements for farm products is the 
so-called "seasonal stock." The idea is to store part of a crop during 
the harvest period of the year when supply is large, and release it back 
into the market in the later part of the year when supply is small. The 
reason behind the effort of the Thai Government to initialize a seasonal 
stock program for rice in Thailand is that farm prices of rice during 
the normal rice harvesting period of the year are usually lower than those 
in the other part of the year. A study by Dr. Udhis Nakaswadi 
indicated that most Thai rice farmers sold approximately 70 percent of 
the yearly marketed rice during October and March, and the rest later on 
[23] . This fits with the theoretical concept of supply and demand which 
states that, cetaris paribus, greater supply implies lower price and 
reduced supply drives price up (Figure 2). 
Wholesale 
Price 
Indices 
110 
100 
90 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Figure 2. Movements of average wholesale prices of No. 2 paddy in Bangkok 
wholesale market (average prices during 1963-1972) 
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To help improve this disadvantageous position of the Thai rice 
farmers, the Thai Government through its Bank of Agriculture and Agricul­
tural Cooperatives (BAAC) provides loans for farmers so that they can store 
part of their rice production and, hence, reduce supply during the harvest 
periods of the year [33]. Other measures exercised by the Thai Government 
include market intervention by having government agencies buy rice directly 
from farmers, the encouragement of more exports during the early part of 
the year, and the build up of more public storage facilities. 
On the other side of the globe, the United States initiated its price 
support program in 1929 with a view to holding prices up through storage 
operations . The original objective of the storage programs was to 
stabilize prices of farm products against year-to-year variations in pro­
duction. It was intended that by setting the loan rates (for nonrecourse 
commodity loans to farmers) for each crop at the level that permitted 
average weather crops to move into consunption, the excess over average 
weather crops would be removed from the market and put into storage to 
be released back to the market in short crop years. Stabilization of 
prices against variations in production resulting from irregular varia­
tions in weather would be converted into a more nearly smooth flow 
of grain into consumption [26]. 
Another type of stocking arrangement for farm products, the stockpile 
mechanism, is mainly aimed at storing strategic commodities, ... case, rice 
for food security purposes. The idea is to store the strategic food product 
up to the amount that is enough to meet the consumption need of a group 
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of people before the new stream of production of the food crop in question 
could be obtained. Another point is that the reduced stock must be re­
plenished as early as possible. Regardless of how secure this flow of 
the commodity is as a result of this stock policy, the cost of a stock­
pile program is high compared with other programs [3]. 
The concept of food security reserves and the desirability to 
establish reserves such that the supply of a strategic food in a country 
or a group of countries can be secured is just the beginning of the story. 
The types of stocking arrangement that mo rt suit the countries involved, 
the optimum size of the stock, the rules governing accumulation and re­
lease of the stock, and the problems of cost sharing among benefitted 
countries still remain high on the agenda of public debate 
To arrive at the types of stocking arrangement that most suit all 
participating countries of a regionally-coordinated food reserves pro­
gram requires information of a type which is not readily analyzed by any 
analytical tools. In such cases, cordial and open-minded negotiation 
among all countries involved seems to be the best solution to the problem. 
Unlike the problem of selecting suitable stocking arrangements; the 
development of estimates for the optimum size of the stock, viable rules 
governing accumulation and release of the stock, and how to share cost 
among participating member countries are among the subject matters that 
could be technically analyzed to some extent. Following are examples of 
notable works which are aimed at finding solutions to the aforementioned 
problems and which are worth of consideration by any party responsible for 
the establishment of a national and(or) international food reserve. 
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Gustafson has adapted the "optimal inventory approach" of A. 
I Davoretzky, J. Kiefer, and J. Wolfowitz to the analysis of carry-over 
policy for feed grains [19]. For any given set of assumptions, this 
approach leads to a simple storage decision rule which can be expressed 
as follows: An equilibrium level of storage is found when the cost of 
adding one more unit to stocks is equal to the expected level of return 
from its subsequent resale or consumption. The concept, however, is based 
on the maximum monetary profit to storage owners who do not take into ac­
count the social benefit of other members of the economy. 
Reutlinger in his simulation model on worldwide buffer stocks 
of wheat viewed the world as one unified market [25]. Fluctuation in world 
consumption and price were assumed to depend only on fluctuations in 
world production and the extent of storage activity. World grain produc­
tion was estimated on the basis of a large random sample drawn from 
probability distributions. Price was determined on the basis of a demand 
function relating the world price to quantity of grain available for con­
sumption. The storage rules were as follows: If production was above 
a prespecified level (and the price below a certain level), the surplus 
grain was put into storage. If, on the other hand, production was below 
a prespecified level (and the price above a certain level), grain was 
withdrawn from storage to augment supplies from production up to the pre­
specified level. 
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Consumer gaiâs or losses and, hence, economic gains and losses were 
measured in terms of consumer surplus. Gains and losses of producers 
and storage owners were measured directly. Finally, economic gains and 
losses were taken as the summation of gains and losses of consumers, 
producers and storage owners. 
The following graphic presentation (Figure 3) illustrates the above 
concept of Reutlinger for gains and losses from a world grain reserve. 
Price 
* Quantity 
Ql Qi* Qz* Qz 
= price and quantity in deficit years; 
P^*, Q^* = price and quantity after stock releasing; 
Pg, Q2 ~ price and quantity in surplus years; 
Pg*, Qg* = price and quantity with stock accumulation. 
Figure 3. Storage benefits and losses 
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In a year of accumulation of stocks: 
Consumer benefits = -c-g-j-m 
Producer benefits c+g+j+mfl 
Benefits of storage operators = -1-m-n 
Economic benefits —m—n 
In a year of release of stocks: 
Consumer benefits a+e 
Producer benefits -a 
Benefits of storage operators = f+g+h 
Economic benefits e+f+g+h 
Consumer benefits, benefits to storage operators, and economic 
benefits are always negative in years when stocks are accumulated and 
positive in years when grains are released from storage. Producers, on 
the other hand, always gain when grain is put into storage and always 
lose when grains are released from storage. 
The above work of Reutlinger, as hypothetical as it was, does give 
interesting points of conflict among different participants of the economy. 
The problem is the relative frequency between years of accumulation and years 
of release. One may tell by experience that years of plenty which bring 
about accumulation of stocks are prone to be more frequent and thus so are 
the economic losses. Whether the frequency of gains by producers are of 
more consideration than those of economic losses gives rise to another 
dimension of interesting debate. 
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Sriplung and Hanpongpandh [29] employed the rice demand equation for 
Thailand worked out by Sriplung and Manowalailao [28], and the stochastic 
technique of estimation, in their proposal of a rice buffer stock scheme 
to the Government of Thailand. The size of the proposed buffer stock 
which was estimated at 800,000 tons of paddy was based on the amount of 
rice required to enumerate unexpected losses and stablize rice price dur­
ing the worst year found in the study. 
In 1973, Rogers developed a linear programming model to determine 
the optimal solution to the rice buffer stock program in Thailand [21]. 
Focus of the model was directed at domestic demand, domestic supply, ex­
ports, and storage during three basic seasons of the year. The three 
seasons were identified as the prime harvesting and marketing season for 
the first and second crops, and a third season with or without a minimal 
rice harvest. Basic input for the model included published research on 
supply and demand response, estimated farm storage capacity, and data on 
production, exports, and prices. The objective function of the model 
included production costs, direct and indirect storage costs, and revenue. 
The optimum solution jointly maximized consumer and producer welfare sub­
ject to economic and physical constraints. Specifically, the objective 
of the first model was to determine the production, consumption, export, 
storage, and price patterns which would jointly maximize welfare for 
consumers and producers, subject to selected policy goals. 
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Chaiprawat, as reviewed by Ungphagorn [34], presented an interesting 
simulation study on international rice buffer stock operations at the 
World Commodity Conference on Stabilizing World Commodity Markets at 
Airlie, Virginia. The objectives of the study were spelled out as: 
(1) to make stochastic simulations of the world rice markets and result­
ing world prices during a 20-year period from 1977 to 1997; (2) to 
estimate possible sizes and resource requirements of the international 
rice buffer stock operations in order to stabilize the world price within 
given ranges around its long-term normal trend; and (3) to assess profit­
ability of the international buffer stock operations at various rates of 
interest and other charges. 
An econometric model of the world rice markets was constructed. The 
domestic demand for rice in each country is divided into consumption 
demand which is used up in one year, and stock building demand by private 
traders during the year. The total domestic demand equation is related 
to a common set of variables for each country which includes population, 
real income, domestic price of rice relative to the cost of living index, 
carry-over stock at the beginning of the year, difference between ex­
pected future price and current price of rice, and a disturbance term. 
On the supply side, rice output in individual countries and 
collectively in the world production are exogenously determined for the 
most part by weather during the production period. Unlike the model of 
demand, the price of rice, either of the current year or of the preced­
ing year, plays no role in the determination of supply. Chaiprawat found 
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in his model that the response of rice planted area in Thailand to lagged 
price was quite inelastic and the price elasticity of demand was much 
lower than those of other cash crops. Using the assumption that, except 
for the annual weather-induced disturbance term, world rice output tends 
to grow exponentially at a constant rate, future world rice output was 
deterministically or stochastically generated from the following equations. 
"Vl/t ' Ae®''-" (1) 
In WQ^ = InA + g(t-l) + lnU^_^ (2) 
where : 
WQ , = world rice output for t-l/t crop year; 
t—1/1 
g = a constant rate of growth; and 
U = an annual weather-induced disturbance term. 
The deterministic simulation is made when the disturbance term U , t-± 
is assumed to be a unit while in the stochastic simulation, (U^ or 
(InU^ is allowed to take on different values of randomly selected 
numbers. In this study, Chaiprawat selected random numbers for future 
periods from in-sample residual values of the least square estimate of 
the above world output equation. 
Current domestic prices were solved as endogenous variables, the 
result of equating total world output to total world domestic demand. 
The stochastically-generated patterns of world rice movements were used 
in the model to determine resource requirements and profitability of the 
international rice buffer stock operations. 
25 
B. The Demand Function 
In the basic theory of consumer behavior, a consumer is supposed to 
derive a certain level of satisfaction or utility from consuming a com­
modity within a specified time period. To compare the levels of satis­
faction earning from different commodity baskets, it can be proved that 
ordinal measurement of utility is satisfied for the risk-free case. How­
ever, for consumption under risk the practical usefulness of adopting 
cardinal utility measurement has been shown [20], 
In comparing a consumer's satisfaction earning from different 
commodity baskets in a two-commodity world, the so-called Indifference 
Curve and Indifference Map are introduced (Figure 4). An indifference 
curve is defined as a locus of points each of which is the combined units 
of the goods that a consumer may select and that yield him equal satis­
faction. An indifference map is a collection of a consumer's indifference 
curves. 
In the context of substitutability between two different goods, the 
Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) or the Rate of Commodity Substitution 
(RCS) between good X and Y is defined as the number of units of good X 
a consumer is willing to obtain in substitution for the sacrifice of a unit 
of good Y such that his previous satisfaction level can be maintained. 
How easy the two goods can be substituted is reflected by the slope of the 
related indifference curves (Figures 5, 6 and 7). 
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Good Y 
Good X 
Figure 4. Indifference curves and indifference map 
Good Y 
• U 3 
U, 
'U, 
Good X 
Figure 5. Y and X are used in fixed proportion 
X X 
Figure 6. Y and X are substitutable 
with changing rates of 
substitution 
Figure 7. Y and X are 
substitutable with 
constant rate of 
substitution 
27 
With the total utility function of a consumer defined as U(X,Y), 
the marginal rate of substitution of good X for good Y can be written as 
au(x.Y)/ax 
au(X,Y)/9Y 
by taking the total derivative of U(X,Y) 
dU(X,Y) =11 dX + Iy dY = 0 
and au/ ax 
au/ aY 
M 
dX 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
which is the slope of the indifference curve itself. 
A consumer's budget line is nothing but an opportunity set that 
limits the possibility that the consumer could obtain any set of commodi­
ties to satisfy his wants (Figure 8), Algebraically, the slope of the 
budget line is the price ratio of the goods in question. 
Y 
I/Py 
' If 
X 
Figure 8. A consumer's budget line 
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To maximize the utility of a consumer who has a limited budget I, 
the Lagrangian Multiplier can be applied as follows. 
Maximize V = U(X,Y) - \(I-PxX - PyY) 
H • i 
H  - I f  - P y = 0  ( 7 )  
Iy = I - PxX - PyY = 0 ( 8 ) 
OA 
It follows from equations (6 ) and (7): 
5U/ ax _ Px / g \ 
ÔU/ BY Py ^ 
which is also 
dY _ Px 
dX Py 
(10) 
From the above equations comes a conclusion that, under specified 
assumptions (convex and nonintersecting indifference curves, nonsatia-
tion of a consumer*s wants or more is better than less, and the satisfac­
tion with the second-order derivatives of the above Lagrangian equations) 
a rational consumer maximizes his utility by selecting the point where 
his budget line just touches the highest indifference curve in his in­
difference map. 
A change in the price of a commodity, cetaris paribus, creates two 
important economic forces, the substitution or price effect and the income 
effect. These two effects lead to changes in quantity demanded of a good 
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due to changes in its prices in different ways. Slutsky through the 
second-ordered condition of maximizing a consumer's preference, came up 
with the well-known Slutsky Equation that quantifies the change in consump­
tion resulting from price changes into two categories, the substitution 
and the income effects [27]. To reiterate, the total effect of a change 
in price of a good on the change in quantity demanded of that good can be 
written as: 
ôqi 
ÔP, constant prices constant (11) 
where : 
ôq 
= the total effect of a price change; 
(%) = the substitution effect or the rate at which a consumer 
u constant 
substitutes for other goods when the price of 
changes and he moves along a given indifference curve. 
The substitution effect is always negative; and 
prices = the income effect which states consumer's reaction with 
constant 
respect to purchases of to changes in his income while 
prices remain constant. This effect may be either posi­
tive or negative. 
As defined in many microeconomic texts [20], a normal good is one with 
a positive income effect the magnitude of which is less than the substitu­
tion effect. Through the Slutsky equation, the total effect of a change in 
price of a normal good is negative. An inferior good is one with a negative 
income effect of less magnitude than the substitution effect. It has a 
negative effect as well. 
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A Giffin good, on the other hand, is one with negative income effect 
which exerts a greater magnitude than that of the substitution effect 
and, thus, gives rise to a positive total effect. This good, however, is 
not normal and is believed by some economists to be nonexistent. 
A demand curve for a good by any consumer is defined as the locus 
of points giving the amount of the good that the consumer would purchase 
per unit of time at different unit prices. Through the Slutsky equation 
the demand curve for a normal good or an inferior good which is not a 
Giffin good must be negatively sloped. Other things being equal, an in­
crease (decrease) in the price of a non-Giffin good would decrease (increase) 
the amount demanded of that good. 
Two interesting characteristics of a demand curve for a good are 
its price and income elasticities. The price (income) elasticity of 
demand for a good is defined as the percentage change in the quantity 
demanded of that good with respect to the percentage change in price 
(income). Algebraically, the price and the income elasticities of demand 
can be written as follows: 
Price elasticity = and (12) 
âp q 
Income elasticity = ^ ^ (13) 
where : 
q = quantity demanded; 
p = price; 
I = income; arid 
Ô = the differential symbol. 
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The demand for a good is said to be price (income) elastic, inelastic 
or has a unitary elasticity if the percentage change in quantity demanded 
is greater than, less than, or equal to the percentage change in price 
(income). A consumer whose demand for a good is highly or absolutely 
price and income inelastic would, other things being equal, consume a 
more or less constant amount of that good no matter how the price of the 
good and his income change. The high price and income inelasticities for 
some strategic goods, like rice, are believed to exist among rice-consuming 
people of many countries. Past records reveal that even in the presence 
of the rapid increase in rice price during the past few years, per capita 
rice consumption in many rice-consuming countries may have been quite 
stable. A greater magnitude of demand response to increase in income, however, 
is found in countries which have relatively less per capita rice consump­
tion. Indonesia is an example of such a country. 
Besides price and income, other factors like individual tastes, 
prices of related products, consuming habits of particular society groups, 
and many other factors may at the same time have influences on the con­
suming behavior and, hence, the demand function of a consumer or of an 
economy as a whole. 
In Thailand, many attempts have been made to derive some rice demand 
functions for both research and policy application purposes. Sriplung 
and Manowalailao [28] developed three rice demand equations for Thailand 
to be elaborated as follows: 
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The Linear Demand Function 
J = 386.038 + .014 - 0.127 f (14) 
N NL L 
Standard errors: (0.078) (0.063) 
= 0.914 P 0.1 
2. The Double-Log Demand Function 
log I = 2.395 + 0.305 log ^  - 0.325 log ^  (15) 
.305 p -.325 
or § = 2-48-813 E <1*) 
Standard errors: (0.602) (0.154) 
= 0.921 P 0.1 
3. The Semi-Log Demand Function 
^ = 4.47 +• 1.69 log ~ - 244 log ^ (17) 
Standard errors: (4.16) (1.06) 
R^ = .925 P 0.1 
where : 
D = the total domestic demand for rice; 
I = the national income; 
L = the consumer price index; 
N = population; and 
P = the price of rice. 
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The double log equation automatically gives the values for income elasticity 
and price elasticity of 0.305 and -0.325, respectively. The first im­
plies that rice is a normal necessary good and the second that rice has 
an inelastic demand. 
Daly used a combination of 48 sets of 14-year data (1959-1972) 
in his Thai rice demand analysis and came up with 5 export demand and 11 
domestic demand equations for rice. [9]. Among the 5 rice export demand equa­
tions, only one shows negative relation between exports and export prices. 
To illustrate: 
EX^ = 18,255.8 - .9359PX5 - 83.446 SA^ ,/NA^ + 7.0613 S, 
t r-1 t t 
(-1.2648) (-2.2584) (1.6454) 
( -.894) (-4.339) (0.919) 
+ ORj._^/N^ - 435.14RAU + 187.21HD (18) 
(1.4459) (0.2312) 
( .416) (0.0) 
where : 
EX^ = exports of rice, thousand metric ton, rough rice basis; 
PX5 = export price of white rice 5% broken f.o.b. Bangkok, baht 
per metric ton; 
SA^ ^ = rice production in East Asia less Thailand, lagged one year; 
Nj. = population of the area; 
= Thailand's rice stocks in current year; 
0R^_^ = Thailand's rice production, lagged one year: 
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+ OR^ ~ capita supply beginning of year not adjusted; 
RAU = U.S. rice supply available for exports and stocks at 
beginning of marketing year (September-August); and 
HD = hostility (and associated events) shifter, 1967-1973 = 1 
and 0 otherwise. 
Figures in paretheses show t-values and elasticities of the variables in 
question, respectively. For the Thai domestic demand for rice all 
equations show negative relation between the demands and selected rela­
tive prices PS5/PW5, PX/PWIO and PX/PWlO, where: 
PX = export price of rice, export unit value, Bangkok, baht per 
metric ton; 
PW5 = wholesale price of white rice 5% broken; and 
PWIO=wholesale price of white rice 10% broken. 
Chaiprawat and Pariwat in their 1976 econometric model of 
world rice markets, worked with 24-yearsi of data (1950-1973) from 84 countries 
whose combined rice output and consumption accounted for about 92 per­
cent of the world's [8]. In their equations, domestic disappearance of rice 
in a country was expressed as a function of selective variables among 
which were mid-year population, real Gross Domestic Product or Gross 
National Product, average domestic price of rice in units of local cur­
rency deflated by the consumer price index, current expectation of future 
price of rice in domestic markets in units of local currency, previous 
year-end volume of carry-over of domestic rice stock, export price of 5% 
Thai white rice, a dummy of year-end carry-over stock of old rice, a 
dummy of world's carry-over stock of old rice at the end of the previous 
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year, dummy variables representing the major change in intragroup rice 
policy of EEC countries since 1969, and a dummy of weather conditions. 
Following are the selective rice demand equations of ASEAN countries 
worked out by Chaiprawat and Pariwat [8]. 
Indonesia 
DD^ = -2,931.99564 + 0.17297Nt (19) 
(8.918) 
= .8052 N = 20 (1954-1973) 
Malaysia 
DD^ = 1,376.68721 + 0.11408RY^ - 2,671.37656(PR^/CPI^) 
(6.899) (-3.309) 
+ 423.09423Z 
t 
(20) 
(5.995) 
R^ = .8713 N = 13 (1961-1973) 
Philippines 
DD^ = -13.18449 + 0.13947Nt 
(12.148) 
(21) 
R^ = .3799 N = 21 (1953-1973) 
Singapore 
DD^ = 10.30027 + 0.21888Nt - 418.20495(PR^/CPI^) (22) 
(2.806) (-2.449) 
R^ = .4527 N = 13 (1961-1973) 
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Thailand 
(DD/Nt) = 170.87706 + 0.04012 (RY^/Nt) + . 196352(EPR^/^_|_^ - PR^) 
(3.251) (2.720) 
- 30.97194DMST^_^ (23) 
(-2.676) 
R^ = .3434 N = 23 (1951-1973) 
where : 
DD^ = the volume of domestic disappearance of rice in country i 
during calendar year t, calculated from known values of 
and where = rice output during the t-l/t 
crop year of country i; = the volume of rice export from 
country i during calendar year t; and = volume of rice 
import into country i during calendar year t; 
EPR^ 
• <-i/c -
Nt^ = mid-year population of country i in calendar year t; 
PR^ = average domestic price of rice in units of local currency; 
RY^ = real gross domestic product or real gross national product; 
CPI^ = consumer price index; 
= current expectation of future price of rice in domestic markets 
(expectation is formed in calendar year t but the price to 
prevail in calendar year (t+1)), also in units of local cur­
rency = .62PR^ + .38PR^ 
= dummy of weather conditions (drought and normal); and 
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DMST^ ^ = dummy of year-end carry-over stock of local rice (exces­
sively high, normal and abnormally low). 
Besides the preceding works on rice demand functions for both 
Thailand and other rice-consuming countries of the world, updating of 
data and exploration of improved rice demand equations have been on trial 
in various institutions of Thailand and the world. Lack of good data, 
political unrest and the subsequent uncertain rice policies in many coun­
tries have been responsible for the hardships of arriving at theoretically 
accepted rice demand equations even at present. To partially seek solu­
tions to the problem, domestic disappearance in both absolute and per 
capita terms has been taken as the presently accepted rice demand 
in many countries. The workshop on Supply and Demand for Food and 
Other Strategic Commodities of the ASEAN Committee on Food, Agriculture 
and Forestry is one of several others that is prone to adopt the domestic 
disappearance technique in its work, at least for the time being. 
C. The Supply Function 
Demand is just one leg of the chopsticks picking up prices and 
quantities. The other leg is supply. A supply curve shows the amount 
of a product that would be supplied per unit of time by any firm or group 
of firms at different prices under given conditions, namely, technology, 
level of resources, and factor supply curves. 
A firm is an intermediary between factor and product markets. It 
purchases a set of factor inputs and transforms them into required output 
that is sold. A firm is also assumed to be a profit maximizer with concave 
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production function. A firm's isoquant is the counterpart of a consumer's 
indifference curve. It is the locus of all combinations of inputs K and 
L which yield an equal output level. The counterpart of a consumer's 
marginal rate of substitution or rate of commodity substitution is a firm's 
marginal rate of technical substitution (MKTS) or rate of technical sub­
stitution (RTS). The marginal rate of technical substitution of input K 
for L or MRTS^ ^ is the additional units of input L that are needed in 
sacrificing a unit of input K in order to maintain the production level 
as before. 
A firm maximizes its profit at the point where its marginal cost 
(if it buys its inputs from competitive firms) or its factor marginal 
cost (if it buys its input from noncompetitive firms) is equal to the 
unit output price (if it is a competitive firm) or to its marginal revenue 
(if it is a noncompetitive firm). The supply curve of a firm is the 
part of its marginal cost curve that lies above the average variable 
cost curve. The supply curve of a multi-firm industry is the enveloped 
curve of all individual supply curves. The rules that govern the rising 
part of a marginal cost curve also dictate that the supply curve of a 
firm or of an industry must be positively sloped. To paraphrase the above, 
an increase in output price magnifies the earning potential of a competi­
tive firm and, thus, encourages it to increase supply. 
Theoretically, price elasticity of supply does not give as discrete 
an implication as that of the demand. An increase in output price alters 
the point of production that a competitive firm could maximize its profit. 
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Its positively-sloped MC curve instructs the firm to produce more when 
price rises. In the longer run, more production of the existing firms 
and that of the new-entry firms enhance the industry's supply curve. If 
demand shifts at a slower rate than that of supply, price would decrease. 
A firm with higher average variable cost than price then has to leave 
the industry. Long-run equilibrium is said to be attained where short-
run average cost = long-run average cost = short-run marginal cost = long-
run marginal cost, or where both short-run and long-run average costs are 
at their minimum. Algebraically, derivation of a supply function should 
end up with the quantity supplied being a function of output price, in­
put prices, and production coefficients. Econometrically, however, the 
disturbance term of the supply equation may be further broken down to 
include such factors as the magnitude of rainfall, governmental policies 
and so on. Besides, the supply function of agricultural commodities 
usually does not relate the amount supplied to the output price of the 
current year but rather to that of the previous year or the previous sea­
son. This lagged supply response to price for most agricultural products 
is based on the lengthy time period needed in the production process of 
the commodity. 
The magnitude of the supply response to prices of a particular farm 
commodity like rice, however, can be said to be quite low for Thailand 
and other rice-producing countries of the ASEAN. One reason behind this 
is that, in the region, rice is mainly planted on lowland where water 
is flooded to some controllable level during the normal rainy season of 
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the year. Such a unique characteristic of the rice field does not allow 
the substitution for rice by any other economic crops. Seedy lotus and 
water chestnut can he grown in the rice field, but they are not economic 
crops in the region. Therefore, as long as rice price does not decline 
too low, most rice farmers are still willing to maintain their past pro­
duction level. In other words, their supply response to a decline in rice 
price is quite low or even nil. The second reason is that rice is the 
main staple of the farmers as well as of other people of the region. In 
Thailand, rice fanners constitute as much as 90 percent of all farmers 
or approximately 63 percent of the country's population. Therefore, dis­
regarding the decline in rice price, the farmers will at least keep on 
producing for their own consumption. Higher growth of farm population 
intensifies this self-feeding production magnitude of the rice farmers, 
and hence, retards the farmer's response to price decreases. 
An increase in rice price, though, is believed to arouse greater 
production which reduces the impact of the price increase. Producers in 
other sectors of Thailand's economy always take the incidence of an in­
crease in rice price as an excuse to ask for an increase in prices of 
their products and services. Visutsootr in his attempt to predict 
Thailand's rice production for the crop year 1976-1977 through the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) technique of linear multiple regression analysis came 
up with 71 equations each representing rice production in each changwad 
(province) of the country [35]. In each equation, rice production in chang­
wad i for the year t is related to the changwad*s rice acreage in the 
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previous year (X_, 2^^); total rainfall during each rainy month of the 
year (R™ ) ranging from May to October; and local farm prices of paddy 
X, t 
in the previous year. 
An example of the equation for Srisagate province in the northeast 
of Thailand is given below: 
May June 
Y. ^ = -434.246094 + 0.005560X, ^ . + 0.706734R. 
x,t i,t-l i,t 
July Aug. Sept. 
+ 1.074665R. ^ + 0.429839R^ ^ + 0.688020R. ^ i,t i,t i,t 
+ 0.062801P. ^ , (24) i,t-l 
2 
With R = 0.94, all independent variables under consideration contribute 
as much as 94 percent to the magnitude of the dependent production vari­
able, The equation shows quite a small effect of price on production 
when compared with the effect of rainfall. The result of the study led 
the writer to conclude that water seemed to be a profound factor in rice 
production. Therefore, an increase of irrigable area was suggested. 
D. The Multivariate Normal Random 
Variables 
The multivariate normal distribution is defined for a vector of 
random variables where each component of the random vector is a 
random variable with given mean and variance [24]. If the 
components of the random variables are not independent, then the covari-
ances between the component variables are not zero and a variance-covariance 
matrix is necessary for the generation of random normal vectors. 
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Denote the n-dimensional random vector by Y with E(Y) = M where 
M is the mean vector. Assume also that Y has a variance-covariance matrix 
S, where 
a. 
= E jlx-M) (X-M)^ 
11 In 
nl <^nn 
(25) 
where denotes the variance of the ith component, and o\^ denotes the 
covariance between the ith and jth components of the random vector. 
Statistical theory asserts that S is always symmetric and the inverse 
-1 S exists. 
Next, the probability density function of X is given by: 
f(x) = ^ 2tS exp. ^ -l/2(x-ra)' S ^(x-m)J (26) 
where 2%S is the determinant of the 2 S matrix. 
The generation of random normal vectors with given mean vector and 
variance-covariance matrix takes account of a theorem which states that 
if Z is a standard normal vector, there exists a unique lower triangular 
matrix C such that 
Y = CZ + M 
In this case, (Y - M) has the variance-covariance 
S = C C 
(27) 
(28) 
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To obtain C from S, the "square root" method is used which provides 
a set of recursive formula for the computation of the elements of C. 
a il 
c 
11 1/2 
(29) 
cr. 
11 
Cii (30) 
j-1 
""ij ~ ""ik Cjk 
c. (31) 
c. jj 
Since C is lower triangular, = 0 for all j > i. After obtaining 
the elements of C, all components of Y can be determined from Z as 
y. = c.. z. + m. (32) 
1 ij 1 1 
The generation of a random vector Y with mean m and variance-covariance 
matrix S can be programmed in the following steps: 
1. Obtain the triangular matrix C from S. 
2. Generate n independent standard normal variates with zero mean 
and unit variance according to the SUBROUTINE CALL GAUSS (ISXXX, SDEV,AM,V) 
where : 
ISXXX = any odd integer between 0 and 32,768 used to initialize the 
random number generator; 
SDEV = the standard deviation of the standard normal vector to be 
generated which is 1.0; 
or Y = C.Z + M (33) 
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AM = the mean of the standard normal variable to be generated 
which is 0.0; and 
V = the resulting normal random vector from the multivariate 
distribution defined by M and S and the probability density 
function of X given in equation (25). 
3. Define Z = V and perform matrix multiplication of C and Z to 
obtain the multivariate random vector Y. The result is a normal random 
vector from the multivariate distribution defined by m, S and equation 
(25). 
E. The ASEAN Rice Security Reserve 
Model; Structure of the Model 
1. Data used 
Data used in the structure of the ASEAN rice reserve model included 
the 1961-1975 annual rice production in white rice equivalent of four 
ASEAN rice-producing countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
and Thailand; the 1961-1975 net imports of rice for the four ASEAN rice-
importing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore); 
Thailand's 1961-1975 annual exports of rice to non-ASEAN countries; and 
the 1961-1975 annual population of the five ASEAN countries [11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17]. ^ 
2. The regression analysis 
Population, per capita rice production, per capita net imports of 
rice, and Thailand's rice export to other countries besides the ASEAN 
were predicted by the following equations; 
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Population: 
POPj^ = (34) 
Per capita production*. 
PCPD.^ = a. + bit + Uit (35) 
it 1 
Net import per capita*. 
Net import = Import-Export 
NMPC^j. = + bit + Uit (36) 
Thai exports to others; 
OXPTHAI = a^ + bit + Uit (37) 
Per capita disappearance: 
PCDD. - til ''"""it + Ml 08) 
t?61 POfit 
where : 
POP^^ = population of country i in year t; 
PCPD^^ = per capita production of county i in year t; 
NMPC^^ = net import per capita of county i in year t; 
OXPTHAI = Thai exports to others; 
PCDD^ = per capita disappearance of country i; 
PROD^^ = yearly rice production of country i in year t; 
IMPORT^^= yearly rice import of country i in year t; 
EXPORT^^ = yearly rice export of country i in year t; 
a,b = parameters; 
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U = disturbance term; 
i = 1, 2, ..., 5; and 
t = 61, 62, ..., 75. 
3. The multivariate normal random 
variables 
Following the procedures described by Naylor et al. [24] and the 
variance-covariance matrix S obtained from the nine equations (four of 
the PCPD, four of the NMPC, and one of the OXPTHAI), a multivariate normal 
random vector Y„ , is obtained as 
9x1 
^9x1 ^9x9 ^9x1 
where : 
C = a unique lower triangular matrix such that = 
®9x9 
= a standard normal vector with zero mean and unit variance. 
The generation of a random vector Y with mean M and variance-
covariance matrix S was programmed in the following steps. 
From Uit of the following nine equations ; 
INCOPCPD = 
'^1 + bj^t + ^1^ 
MALYPCPD = 
*^2 + bgt 
+ 
^2^ 
PHILPCPD = + bgt + U^t 
THAIPCPD = 
*^4 
+ b, t 
4 
+ 
"4^ 
NMPCINDO = 
*^5 •fbjt + 
NMPCMALY = 
*^6 + bjt + ^6^ 
(40) 
t = 1, 2, ..., 15 
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NMPCPHIL = *a^ + b^t + U^t 
NMPCSING = *ag + bgt + Ugt 
OXPTHAL = *ag + b^t + U^t 
Obtaining the variance-covariance matrix: 
15 2 15 15 
Z U t Z D t U t Z U t 0 t 
'-1-^ 
15 15 „ 
V U t U t Z Ugt 
13 (41) 
15 • 15 
E  u  t  u  t  E u t  
t=i t.i ^
Obtain the triangular matrix C from S such that CC' + S. Since C 
is lower triangular, c. =0 for all j ^  i. 
ij 
Generate nine independent standard normal variates, Z^, Z^, Zg, 
with zero mean and unit variance by the computer's SUBROUTINE CALL GAUSS 
(ISXXX, SDEV,AM,V). 
Perform the matrix-vector multiplication and obtain the multivariate 
normal vector Y as follows: 
^9x1 " ^9x9 *^9x1 (42) 
4. Predicted outcomes 
By generating the simulated time onwards as TIME = 76, 77, and so on, 
the predicted population of each country is obtained from 
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POP(N) = EXP (P0PB(1,N) + POPB(w,N) *TIME) 
where P0PB(1,N) and P0PB(2,N) are the parameters and in the 
population equation, respectively. 
With POP(N) obtained from equation (40), the four ASEAN rice production 
levels, APRD(N); the four ASEAN desired net inports from other besides Thailand, 
AOMPT(N); Thailand's desired exports to others, TDOXP(N); and the desired 
consumption of all ASEAN countries, DACON(N); can thus be obtained as 
follows : 
Production 
APRD(N) = POP(N) * PRDB(1,N) + PRDB(2,N) * TIME + Y(N) 
ASEAN desired net imports from others 
AOMPT(N) = POP(N) * TRDB(1,N) + TRDB(2,N) * TIME + Y(N+$) 
Thailand's desired exports to others 
TDOXP = TRDB(1,5) + TRDB(2,5) * TIME + Y(9) 
Desired consumption 
DACON(N) = POP(H) * PCDD(N) 
5. Specified control variables 
The following 10 variables are specified as control variables; 
number of simulated years (NYEAR), number of replications (NREP), initial 
amount of the buffer stock (BEGBS), initial amount of Thailand's private 
stock (BEGPS), maximum amount of buffer stock to be stored (BXTMX), maximum 
amount of Thailand's private stock to be stored (PSTMX), release percentage 
of buffer stock ranging from 0.0 to 0.1 (RELPC), ASEAN preference factor 
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(APRPC) ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 (to explain, the amount of Thai rice to 
be exported to the ASEAN countries should not be less than APRPC times 
the desired ASEAN imports from Thailand or (APRPC * DASNM) in total), 
minimum Thai exports to others—non-ASEAN countries—or (XOMIN), and 
GAUSS initializer which is any odd integer between 0 and 32,678 used to 
initialize the random number generation. 
6. The simulation 
The following explanation of the simulation is set up in a consecutive 
step-wise manner with each step numbered in parentheses for easier refer­
ence and understanding. 
(1) Upon attainment of DACON(N), the desired consumption; APRD(N), 
the predicted production; AOMPT(N), the predicted ASEAN-other imports; 
and TDOXP, the desired Thai-other exports from the regression analysis; 
first define AOMPT(N) as zero if it happens to be less than zero- (The 
purpose of this is to protect the use of security reserves for reexporta­
tion during the time of shortages.) Then define desired Thai-ASEAN trade 
as : 
If AOMPT(N) < 0, AOMPT(N) = 0 then 
DTAT(N) = DACON(N) - APRD(N) - AOMPT(N) 
or the desired Thai-ASEAN trade of an ASEAN country is its desired 
consumption less production less net imports from others besides Thailand. 
(2) If, however, the production plus net Other-ASEAN import of an 
ASEAN country is already greater than its desired consumption, i.e., DTAT(N) 
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is less than zero, then DTAT(N) is defined as zero or Thailand will never 
want to import rice from any ASEAN country. 
If DTAT(N) < 0, DTAT(N) = 0 
In such a case, reduce net Other-ASEAN imports to just meet desired 
consumptions for n = 1, 2, 3. 
AOMPT(N) = DACON(N) - APRD(N) and A0MPT(4) = DACON(N) 
(3) The total amount of desired Thai-ASEAN trade (DASNM) then is 
the sum of each DTAT(N); 
4 
DASNM = Z DTAT(N) 
N=1 
(4) For Thailand, its production, APRD(4), is to be distributed 
among the three sets of demand: DAC0N(5), Thailand domestic demand; 
DASNM, total ASEAN demand; and TDOXP, demand of other countries besides 
the ASEAN. The excess or shortage of such demands or XSSUP will be stored 
in or released out of a centrally-located rice storage to be hereafter 
termed ASEAN Buffer Stock or BSTOK. 
XSSUP = APRD(4) - DAC0N(5) - DASNM - TDOXP 
If XSSUP > 0 store in BSTOK, 
If XSSUP < 0 release out of BSTOK. 
a. The case of positive excess supply, XSSUP >0 The next five 
steps in the continuing explanation of the simulation deal with the posi­
tive excess supply situation. 
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(5) Whether the positive excess supply can be stored in the ASEAN 
buffer stock depends on whether the excess capacity of the buffer storage, 
XSCAP, is positive or negative. 
XSCAP = BSTMN - BSTOK 
If XSCAP > 0, part or all of the XSSUP can be stored in the buffer storage. 
If XSCAP «C. 0, XSSUP must go somewhere else, say, the Thai private stock 
(PSTOK) or to the Thai domestic consumption. 
(6) If there is enough room in the buffer storage such that all 
XSSUP can be stored in it, then BSTOK is increased by XSSUP, which is 
also the amount of change in buffer stock (CHEST). 
BSTOK = BSTOK + XSSUP 
CHBST = XSSUP 
(7) If there is no room or only some room for the XSSUP in the 
buffer storage but not enough to store all of the XSSUP, then there is 
some excess of buffer stock, XSBST, to add to the private stock. 
XSBST = XSSUP - XSCAP 
If XSBST > 0, check if there is room in the private storage. 
(8) Let PSCAP be the capacity of current private stock to absorb 
XSBST to its maximum. 
PSCAP = PSTMX - PSTOK 
If there is enough room in the private storage then all XSBST can be 
stored in it. With no room or only some room available in the private 
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storage, there is some excess of private stock, XSPST, to add to the 
consumption of the Thais and Others. 
If PSCAP > 0, there is some room in the private storage. 
XSPST = XSBST - PSCAP 
If XSPST > 0, the private storage can absorb all of the XSBST and 
the private storage is increased by XSBST. 
PSTOK = PSTOK + XSBST 
XHPST = XSBST 
(9) If XSPST <0, the private storage can absorb only part of the 
XSBST. The XSPST then is added to the Thai consumption, Thai-ASEAN trade 
and Thai-Others trade. Likewise, if there is no room in the private stor­
age, i.e., PSCAP < 0, then all of the XSBST goes to the consumption of 
the Thais, other ASEANs and the non-ASEANs. Under these two conditions 
(PSCAP < Q or PSCAP > 0, but XSPST < 0), the private stock reaches its 
maximum and change in private stock is PSCAP itself. 
PSTOK = PSTMX 
CHPST = PSCAP 
DIS = XSPST/(DAC0N(5) + TDOXA + DASNM) 
KI = 1.0 + DIS 
DAC0N(5) = KI * DAC0N(5) 
TDOXP = KI * TDOXP 
DTATCN) = KI * DTAT(N) 
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After all of the above, production and trade have been reconciled without 
release of the buffer stock. Pass on to step (24). 
b. The case of negative XSSUP In such a situation as negative 
XSSUP, Thai production is not enough to meet all of the 
three demands—DAC0N(5), DASNM and TDOXP. To meet such a deficiency, 
rice from Thailand's private stock alone or both with that of the ASEAN 
buffer stock must be released. 
i. Release of private stock 
(10) First, see if the deficiency can be met from the private stocks. 
If so, reduce private stocks accordingly and set actual trade and consump­
tion equal to the desired ones. If (PSTOK + XSSUP) >• 0, 
PSTOK = PSTOC + XSSUP 
CHPST = XSSUP 
Here, production and trade have been reconciled without release of buffer 
stocks. Set actual consumption, AACON(N), and trade, ATTAT(N) and TAOXP, 
equal to the desired ones. 
ATAT(N) = DTAT(N) 
AACON(N) = APRD(N) + AOMPT(N) + ATAT(N) for N = 1-3 
AACON(4) = A0MPT(4) + ATAT(4) for Singapore 
AAC0N(5) = DAC0N(5) for Thailand 
TAOXP = TDOXP 
ii. Release of buffer stocks 
If desired trade cannot be met from Thai production plus its private 
stock, i.e., PSTOK + XSSUP •^0, determine the amount to be released from 
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the buffer stock (RLEAS). First, define XSDPS as the excess of DAC0N(5) 
+ DASNM + TDOXP over APRD(4) + PSTOK or 
XSDPS = DAC0N(5) + DASNM + TDOXP - APRD(4) - PSTOK 
= (-1.0) * (XSSUP + PSTOK) 
(11) Let the amount to be released from the buffer stock (RLEAS) be 
the release percentage (RELPC) of the excess demand (XSDPS) 
RLEAS = RELPC * XSDPS 
(12) Next, check if the amount to be released is not beyond the 
amount available in the buffer stock. 
If RLEAS C BSTOK, then RLEAS = BSTOK. 
If RLEAS > BSTOK, BSTOK = BSTOK - RLEAS and CHBST = (-1.0) * RLEAS. 
(13) To distribute all that is available now (APRD(4) + PSTOK + 
RLEAS) among the three demands (DAC0N(5) + DASNM + TDOXP), define the 
distributing ratio R. 
APRD(4) + PSTOK + RLEAS - DAC0N(5) 
DASNM + TDOXP 
If R ?»• 0, let it be zero. 
If R < 0, then Thai-ASEAN trade and Thai-Other trade become: 
ATAT(N) = R * DTAT(N) 
TAOXP = R * TDOXP 
(14) Check if the preferences of non-ASEAN countries (OPREF) in 
terms of minimum Thai-Other export (XOMIN) are met. If not, raise Thai-
Other export to XOMIN by the short amount (RELOC) and reduce Thai-ASEAN 
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export accordingly, as long as this does not result in negative Thai-ASEAN 
trade. 
If TAOXP > XOMIN, 
TAOXP = XOMIN 
RELOC = TAOXP - R * TDOXP 
If RELOC = AASNM, 
OPREF = 0 
TAOXP = TAOXP - RELOC + AASNM 
RELOC = AASNM 
ATAT(N) = 0 
If RELOC c AASNM 
ATAT(N) = ATTAT(N) - (DTAT(N)/DASNM) * RELOC. 
(15) If ASEAN preference is not met, i.e., raising Thai-Other 
export to XOMIN results in the reduction of Thai-ASEAN export less than 
the minimum level (ARRPC * DASNM), set indicator APREF to show this 
^ ~ TDOXP + DASNM ^ APRPC, then 
APREF = 0. 
(16) If the minimum Thai-Other export (XOMIN) happens to be greater 
than the desired one (TDOXP), reduce actual trade to TDOXP. 
If TAOCP > TDOXP, then set TAOXP = TDOXP. 
See if surplus of Thai consumption (APRD(A) + PSTOK + RLEAS -
DACON(5)) is enough for the reallocated TAOXP. 
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(17) If not, reduce TAOXP and set OPREF indicator accordingly. 
Also set Thai-ASEAN trade equal to zero. 
If (APRD(4) + PSTOK + RLEAS - DAC0N(5))< TAOXP 
TAOXP = APRD(4) + PSTOK + RLEAS - DAC0N(5) 
OPREF = 0 
ATAT(N) = 0 
(18) If the reallocated TAOXP (now = XOMIN) is just met by the 
Thai consumption surplus, the Thai-Other preference is met but the Thai-
ASEAN preference is not, as the Thai-ASEAN trade becomes zero. 
If (APRD(A) + PSTOK + RLEAS - DAC0N(5)) = TAOXP 
ATAT(N) = 0 
If the excess Thai consumption is greater than the TAOXP (=XOMIN), test 
if the ASEAN trade preference is met. 
(19) If not (R •< APRPC), define REMAX as the maximum reallocation 
of other exports consistent with XOMIN, and RENIN, the minimum allocation 
satisfying ASEAN trade preference (APRPC * DASNM). 
REMAX = TAOXP - XOMIN 
REMIN = (APRPC - R) * DASNM 
(20) If REMAX is greater than REMIN, reallocate to meet ASEAN 
preference and reduce Thai-Other exports accordingly. 
If REMAX > REMIN 
ATAT(N) = APRPC * DTAT(N) 
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TAOXP = TAOXP - RENIN 
AASNM = AASNM + REMIN 
(21) If REMAX is not greater than REMIN, reduce other exports to 
XOMIN and reallocate this difference to ASEAN exports. Set indicator 
showing ASEAN preference is not met. 
If REMAX < REMIN 
TAOXP = XOMIN 
STAT(N) = ATAT(N) + * REMAX 
APREF = 0 
(22) Calculate actual consumption. 
AACON(N) = APRD(N) + AOMPT(N) + ATAT(N) for N = 1, 3 
AAC0N(4) = A0MPT(4) + ATAT(N) 
AAC0N(5) = APRD(4) - TAOXP - AASNM - CHBST - CHPST 
(23) Go to the next year. New-year populations will be obtained 
from the population equation from which desired consumption is computed. 
Expected productions, Thai-Other exports, and net ASEAN-Other imports are 
also newly obtained from the stochastic equations. Owing to the charac­
teristics of the equations which relate the attributes of interest only 
to time, the expected outcomes would be sound only within a narrow period 
of the simulated time, say, six years. Replications, however, can be 
done as many times as allowed by the capacity of the existing computer, 
say, 200 replicates. 
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(24) Upon the completion of the replicated runs, the means and the 
standard deviations of all attributes of interest are recorded for the 
mid-year and final year of the simulated period. 
F. Stepwise Illustration of the Model 
Given : Per capita consumption of each country (PCDD(N)) and 
all "user specified controlling variables" including 
BEGBS, BEGPS, BSTMX, PSTMX, RELPC, APRPC, XOMIN, NYRS, 
NREPS, AND ISEED. 
Calculate: Total desired Thai-ASEAN imports as the sum of 
all DTAT(N). 
DASNM = ,DTAT(N) 
N=1 
Estimate: POP(N), DACON(N), APRD(N), TDOXP, and AOMPT(N). 
Compute ; Desired Thai-ASEAN trades as the difference 
production plus net imports from others. 
DTAT(N) = DACON(N) - APRD(N) - AOMPT(N) 
between each country's desired consumption and its 
Check : If the sole Thai production is enough to satisfy its 
XSSUP = APRD(4) - DAC0N(5) - TDOXP - DASNM 
Is XSSUP less than, equal to or greater than zero? 
desired consumption and the trades with both parties. 
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Yes (XSSUP i 0) No (XSSUP t 0) 
Place the positive XSSUP in 
the buffer storage as long 
as it is allowed by the 
storage capacity. 
The rest of XSSUP, if any, 
will be kept in the Thai's 
private storage. This is 
also limited by the current 
storage capacity. 
Any excess of the buffer 
and the private storages to 
be reallocated proportionally 
among DAC0N(5), ATAT(N), and 
and TDOXP. 
Calculate actual consumptions, 
ending Thai private stock and 
ending buffer stock. 
Go to the next year, reestimate POP(N), APRD(N), AOMPT(N) and 
TDOXP(N). Redo the whole steps until NYRS and NREPS are reached. 
Calculate the means and the standard deviations of all attributes 
of interestt 
private storage, if any. 
Draw rice from the Thai 
If ASEAN preference is not met 
this. 
set indicator APREF to show 
OPREF to show this. 
met; if not, reduce Thai-ASEAN 
Thai-Other export (XOMIN) is 
still is not met, set indicator 
Check if the required minimum 
trade accordingly. If XOMIN 
percentage of the excess 
demands. 
still not enough to meet the 
from buffer stock as a fixed 
three demands, release rice 
If the Thai production, plus 
its privately stored rice, is 
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The following are the coded terms and their meanings of the model 
simulation. 
PCDD(N) = per capita domestic disappearance of the Nth ASEAN 
countries, N = 1, 5; 
BEGPS beginning level of Thai private stock; 
PSTMX = maximum space of Thai private stock; 
PSTOK = ongoing level of Thai private stock; 
BEG6S = beginning level of ASEAN buffer stock; 
BSTMX = maximum space of ASEAN buffer stock; 
BSTOK = ongoing level of ASEAN buffer stock; 
XOMIN = minimum level of Thai-Other export; 
APRPC = ASEAN preference percentage; 
RELPC = release percentage of ASEAN buffer stock; 
POP(N) = estimated population of each ASEAN country; 
DACON(5)=desired Thai consumption; 
APRD(N) = estimated production of each ASEAN country; 
ARPD(4) = estimated Thai production; 
TDOXP = desired Thai export to others; 
AOMPT(N)=estimated ASEAN import from others; 
XSSUP = excess Thai supply; 
XSCAP = available space of ASEAN buffer stock; 
XSBST = excess of ASEAN buffer stock; 
PSCAP = available space of Thai private stock; 
XSPST = excess of Thai private stock; and 
RLEAS = released amount of rice from ASEAN buffer stock. 
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III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
A. The Per Capita Domestic Disappearances 
As shown at the end of Tables 1 through 5, the average per capita 
domstic disappearance of each ASEAN country can be summarized as follows: 
Indonesia: 100.47 kilograms 
Malaysia: 127.20 kilograms 
Philippines: 81.87 kilograms 
Singapore: 98.36 kilograms 
Thailand: 195.10 kilograms 
To conform with the latest report of Indonesia, its per capita domestic 
disappearance was, in the model, taken as 110.0 kilograms. 
B. The Econometric Works 
With 16 years of population data during 1961 to 1975 for all five ASEAN 
countries, per capita rice production of the four rice-producing countries, 
expect Singapore; per capita net rice imports of the four rice-importing coun­
tries, except Thailand; and rice exports of Thailand to the rest of the 
world; the following 14 ordinary least square equations were arrived at. 
1. Population equations 
i 
Indonesia ; 
POP(l) = Exp. (9.920448 + 0.025303 TIME) (43) 
Table 1. Population, production, imports and distributions, and per capita domestic disappearance 
of rice in Indonesia 
Distribution of Imports Domestic Disappearance 
Year Population Production From Thailand From Others Exports Total Per Capita 
(thousands) (thousand tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (kilograms) 
1961 95,655 8,548 376,102 687,658 — — 9,611,760 100.48 
1962 97,765 7,855 266,166 829,881 8,951,047 91.56 
1963 100,570 8,453 337,718 737,592 9,528,310 94.74 
1964 102,426 7,537 452,453 571,998 —— 8,561,451 83.59 
1965 105,070 7,999 108,656 84,344 8,192,000 77.97 
1966 107,789 8,434 166,974 139,026 8,740,000 81.08 
1967 110,584 8,872 176,551 169,499 9,218,000 83.36 
1968 113,459 8,594 44,517 662,583 9,301,100 81.98 
1969 116,418 9,658 81,342 523,258 — —  10,262,600 88.15 
1970 119,467 10,109 143,991 812,139 11,065,130 92.62 
1971 122,603 12,483 104,841 403,659 12,991,500 105.96 
1972 125,826 12,131 164,360 569,940 12,865,300 102.25 
1973 129,139 11,720 266,925 1,595,766 13,582,691 105.18 
1974 132,544 14,236 129,092 1,002,981 — 15,368,073 115.95 
1975 136,044 14,820 11,525 681,111 15,512,636 114.03 
Total 1,715,359 151,449 2,831,213 9,471,385 — — 163,751,598 95.46 
Table 2. Population, production, imports and distribution, exports total, and per capita 
domestic disappearance of rice in Malaysia 
Year Population Production 
Distribution of Imports 
Exports 
Domestic Disappearance 
From Thailand From Others Total Per Capita 
(thousands) (thousand tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (kilograms) 
1961 8,083 698 248,107 175,771 20,552 1,101,326 136.25 
1962 8,319 664 198,879 193,513 22,775 1,033,617 124.25 
1963 8,561 738 250,599 226,667 9,784 1,205,482 140.81 
1964 8,829 772 293,512 213,487 7,117 1,271,882 144.06 
1965 9,040 717 271,037 117,229 36,524 1,068,742 118.22 
1966 9,339 791 154,094 182,272 32,327 1,095,039 117.25 
1967 9,607 790 204,431 189,187 10,157 1,173,461 112.15 
1968 9,890 776 190,992 125,009 2,273 1,089,728 110.18 
1969 10,170 931 151,427 164,829 6,605 1,240,651 121.99 
1970 10,466 1,038 127k924 238,312 4,201 1,400,035 133.77 
1971 10,770 1,091 117,546 133,059 4,300 1,337,405 124.18 
1972 11,085 1,176 113,021 116,821 27,289 1,378,533 124.36 
1973 11,409 1,187 28,262 270,883 26,282 1,469,863 128.83 
1974 11,745 1,280 74,293 279,594 14,615 1,619,272 137.87 
1975 12,093 1,334 18,438 190,944 14,600 1,528,782 126.42 
Total 149,406 13,983 2,542,562 2,817,577 239,301 19,013,838 127.26 
Table 3. Population, production, imports and distribution, exports total, and per capita 
domestic disappearance of rice in the Philippines 
Distribution of Imports Domestic Disappearance 
Year Population Production From Thailand From Others Exports Total Per Capita 
(thousands) (thousand tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (kilograms) 
1961 28,727 2,079 140,838 46,962 53 2,266,747 78.91 
1962 29,257 2,542 356 357,644 37 2,899,963 86.88 
1963 30,293 2,579 71,428 184,572 90 2,834,910 93.58 
1964 31,056 2,498 109,234 189,625 91 2,796,768 80.06 
1965 32,030 2,595 129,899 429,661 26 3,154,534 98.49 
1966 33,049 2,647 48,952 59,232 20 2,755,164 83.37 
1967 34,113 2,661 99,872 190,580 1,054 2,950,398 86.49 
1968 35,224 2,965 9 8 36,658 2,928,351 83.14 
1969 36,387 2,889 5 5 550 2,888,460 79.38 
1970 37,604 3,401 106 0 1,239 3,399,867 90.41 
1971 38,875 3,473 213,088 157,320 5 3,843,403 98.87 
1972 40,199 3,315 310,004 145,887 4,680 3,766,211 93.69 
1973 41,572 3,184 14,099 316.122 3,381 3,510,840 84.45 
1974 42,987 3,636 47,214 119.078 1 3,802,291 88.45 
1975 44,437 3,636 74,797 59,980 18 3,770,759 84.86 
Total 535,810 44,100 1,259,901 2,256,676 47,903 47,568,674 88.78 
Table 
Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Total 
Population, imports and distribution, exports total, and per capita domestic 
disappearance of rice in Singapore 
Population 
Distribution of Imports 
Exports 
Domestic Disappearance 
From Thailand From Others Total Per Capita 
(thousands) (tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (kilograms) 
1,687 195,401 140,098 142,511 192,988 114.40 
1,773 172,787 176,743 187,807 161,723 91.21 
1,775 176,865 263,002 223,399 216,468 121.95 
1,842 227,762 42,504 108,722 161,544 87.70 
1,880 172,273 118,761 99,127 191,907 102.08 
1,934 143,256 118,253 106,539 154,970 80.13 
1,978 118,672 137,533 79,465 176,740 89.35 
2,012 130,901 156,603 73,367 214,137 106.43 
2,043 133,828 103,619 48,302 189,145 92.58 
2,075 139,417 154,123 46,684 246,856 118.97 
2,110 202,388 103,197 47,204 258,381 122.46 
2,147 342,192 34,428 71,191 305,429 142.26 
2,185 84,617 154,068 43,939 194,746 89.13 
2,219 86,539 77,817 15,089 149,267 67.27 
2,248 103,568 43,012 19,042 127,538 56.73 
29,908 2,430,466 1,823,761 1,312,388 2,941,839 98.36 
Table 5. Population, exports total and per capita domestic disappearance of rice in Thailand 
Exports Domestic Disappearance 
Year Population Production To ASEAN To Others Total Per Capita 
(thousands) (thousand tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (kilograms) 
1961 27,181 5,063 960,448 613,248 3,489,304 128.37 
1962 27,995 6,598 638,186 633,077 5,326,737 190.27 
1963 28,884 7,312 836,610 581,063 5,894,327 204.07 
1964 29,733 7,911 1,082,961 813,327 6,014,712 202.29 
1965 30,641 7,598 681,865 1,213,358 5,702,777 186.12 
1966 31,581 7,257 513,276 994,274 5,749,450 182.05 
1967 32,555 8,775 599,526 882,746 7,292,728 224.01 
1968 33,569 7,279 366,419 711,522 6.201,059 184.73 
1969 34,631 7,891 366,602 656,462 6,867,936 198.32 
1970 35,745 10.667 411,428 652,178 9,603,384 268.66 
1971 36,915 8,625 637,863 953,521 7,033,616 190.54 
1972 38,140 8,934 929,577 1,193,236 6,811,187 178.58 
1973 39,414 8,068 403.903 444,814 7,219,283 183.17 
1974 40,734 9,684 337,138 708,881 8,637,981 212.06 
1975 42,093 8,564 208,828 737,877 7,617,295 180.96 
Total 509,811 120,226 8,974,640 11,789,584 99,461,776 195.10 
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Malaysia 
P0P(2) = Exp. (7.244740 + 0.028734 TIME) (44) 
Philippines 
P0P(3) = Exp. (8.317281 + 0.031717 TIME) (45) 
Singapore 
P0P(4) = Exp. (6.251845 + 0.019740 TIME) (46) 
Thailand 
P0P(5) = Exp. (8.304437 + 0.031179 TIME) (47) 
2. Per capita rice production and 
annual rice production 
Indonesia 
PCPDINDO = -0.038117 + 0.001845 TIME (48) 
Malaysia 
PCPDMALY = -0.055915 + 0.002181 TIME (49) 
Philippines 
PCPDPHIL = 0.066446 + 0.000231 TIME (50) 
Thailand 
PCPDTHAI = 0.281129 - 0.000658 TIME (51) 
3. Per capita net imports of rice 
Indonesia 
NMPCINDO = 0.000243 - 0.000076 TIME (52) 
Malaysia 
NMPCMALY = 0.037345 - 0.000293 TIME (53) 
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Philippines 
NMPCPHIL = 0.028424 - 0.000354 TIME (54) 
Singapore 
NMPCSING = -0.140426 + 0.002303 TIME (55) 
4. Thai rice exports to others 
OXPTHAI = 669.642213 + 1.711221 TIME (56) 
C. The Multivariate Normal Random Variables 
Following the procedures described in Section II.D., the estimated 
residuals from each predicted year of equations (48) through (56), the 
U. , were used in reaching the variance-covariance matrix S from which 1 t 
a matric C was derived such that C.C' = S. 
Through SUBROUTINE CALL GAUSS (ISXXX, SDEV,SM,V) of FORTRAN IV and 
the process as described in Section II.G., a set of nine different multi­
variate normal random variables Y(N) were obtained for each run of the 
simulated model. Adding each Y(N) to the relevant equations (48) through 
(56) embodied each with the required stochastic property needed in the 
experiments with the model. 
In experimenting with the model, different sets of specified controls 
were given for each run of the model. 
D. The User-Specified Controls 
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1. Number of simulated years 
The stochastic nature of the equations which, at the same time, 
does not include variables other than time due to lack of data, does not 
allow close estimation of relevant variables if the simulating period 
is carried out too long. Bearing this in mind, the number of years sim­
ulated was six. 
2. Number of replications for each set 
of the simulated years (NREPS) 
To conform with the limited capacity of the computer facilities 
available, 200 replications of each round of the six-year period were 
assigned. 
3. Beginning level of the buffer 
stocks (BEGBS) 
Taking the current situation where the proposed regional buffer 
stock has not yet been established, and the proposal of Indonesia that 
each country should, in the beginning, deposit 50,000 tons of rice in 
the regional stock; the beginning levels of the stock were given at zero 
and 250,000 tons, respectively. 
4. Beginning level of the Thai private 
stocks (BEGPS) 
Based on records indicating a carry-over stock of rice of 1.32 million 
tons in 1977 [32], which was taken as the base year of the model, and the 
pipeline level of approximately 1.0 million tons [31], the beginning level 
of Thai private stock over the pipeline level was given as 320,000 tons. 
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5. Sizes of the centrally-located 
buffer stock (BSTMX) 
This is taken as one of the parameters of interest. To study the 
effects of such sizes on average per capita consumption of each ASEAN 
country, the probability that Thailand could meet the preferential level 
of desired Thai-ASEAN rice trade and the minimum amount of desired export 
of Thai rice to the rest of the world; different sizes of the regional 
stocks were given, starting from zero to 250,000 tons. 
6. Sizes of Thailand's private 
stock (PSTMX) 
Taking the maximum carry-over of rice in Thailand during 1968-1975 
which was 2.36 million tons in 1972 minus the pipeline level of 1.0 
million tons, the size of Thailand's private stock was rounded at approx­
imately 1.5 million tons. 
7. The release percentage of 
buffer stocks (RELPC) 
Like that of the private stocks, the release of buffer stocks should 
not be allowed to carry on until the entire stock is depleted. Part of 
the stock should be kept to safeguard losses from great natural catastrophes, 
war and other unpredictable emergencies. To manage this, the release 
percentages of buffer stock rice were given as 70, 80 and 90 percent. 
This also implies that the pipeline levels of the regional rice buffer 
stocks were maintained at 30, 20, and 10 percent of the existing stock. 
71 
8. The ASEAN preference percentages 
(APRPC) 
As defined in the model, preferences of the four rice-importing 
countries of the ASEAN, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
and Singapore, are met if each could finally obtain at least the APRPC 
percent of its desired import demand of Thai rice or APRPC of DTAT(N). 
This APRPC was given at 90 percent (0.9) for all rice-importing members 
of the ASEAN. 
9. Maximum exports of Thai rice to 
non-ASEAN countries 
To allow Thailand to maintain its rice trading relationship with its 
older good customers like Hong Kong and some Arabian countries and to 
use part of its rice for diplomatic purposes like that given on a grant 
basis to Laos, several Levels of minimum exports of Thai rice to countries 
other than the ASEAN were tested by setting the minimum at 100,000 and 
200,000 tons, respectively. 
E. The Simulation Results 
1. Beginning levels of buffer stock 
With a beginning buffer stock of zero, the probabilities of meeting 
ASEAN import preferences after three years of the 200 six-year simulation 
were found to range from 0.72 to 0.91 (Tables 6, 7 and 8), with an average 
of 0.855 (Table 9). 
With beginning buffer stock of 250,000 tons and maximum buffer stock of 
the same size, the three-year probabilities were found to fluctuate between 
0.89 and 0.94 or an average probability of 0.919 (Table 10). This was a 6.4 
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Table 6. Probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences in Year 3 
when beginning buffer stock is zero and releasing percentage 
is 70 
Minimum Probabilities of Meeting Minimumum ASEAN 
Thai-Others Import Preferences When Maximum Sizes of 
Exports Buffer Stocks are of the Following 
(thousand (thousand tone) 
Total Aver­
ages 
tons) 0 50 100 150 200 250 
0 
00 
.90 00
 00 oo 00 00 
.90 5.21 .868 
100 .74 
00 00 00 00 
.90 .87 .88 5.15 .858 
200 .75 .82 .86 00
 
.86 .85 4.98 .830 
Total 2.27 2.60 2.61 2.62 - 2.61 2.63 15.34 2.556 
Averages .757 .867 .870 .873 .870 .877 5.114 .852 
Table 7. Probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences in Year 3 
when beginning buffer stock is zero and releasing percentage 
is 80 
Minimum 
Thai-Others 
Exports 
(thousand • 
Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Import Preferences When Maximum Sizes of 
Buffer Stocks are of the Following 
(thousand tons) 
Total Aver­
ages 
tons) 0 50 100 150 200 250 
0 
00 
.91 .87 .86 .91 .86 5.19 .865 
100 .78 .86 .88 .88 .90 .88 5.18 .863 
200 .72 .84 .84 .84 .88 .87 4.99 .832 
Total 2.28 2.61 2.59 2.58 2.69 2.61 15.36 2.50 
Averages .760 .870 .863 .860 .897 .870 5.120 .853 
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Table 8. Probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences in Year 3 
when beginning buffer stock is zero and releasing percentage 
is 90 
Minimum Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Thai-Others Import Preferences When Maximum Sizes of 
Exports Buffer Stocks are of the Following 
(thousand (thousand tons) 
Total Averages 
tons) 0 50 100 150 200 250 
0 .82 .90 .88 ,88 .88 .89 5 .25 .875 
100 .78 .88 .90 .87 .86 .85 5, .14 .857 
200 .78 .83 .84 .86 .88 .90 5, .09 .848 
Total 2.38 2.61 2.62 2.61 2.62 2.64 15, .48 2.580 
Averages .793 .870 .873 .870 .873 .880 5. 159 .860 
Table 9. Effects of minimum Thai-Other export and buffer stock 
releasing percentages in Year 3 when beginning buffer stock 
is zero 
Minimum Thai-
Others Exports 
(thousand tons) 
Probabilities of Meeting Minimum 
ASEAN Imports When Releasing Per-
Total Averages 
70 80 90 
0 .868 .865 .875 2.608 .869 
100 .858 .863 .857 2.578 .859 
200 .830 .832 .848 2.510 .837 
Total 2.556 2.560 2.580 7.696 2.565 
Averages .852 .853 .860 2.565 .855 
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Table 10. Effects of minimum Thai-Other Export and buffer stock 
releasing percentages in Year 3 when beginning buffer stock 
is 250,000 tons 
Minimum Thai- Probabilities of Meeting ASEAN 
Others Exports Imports Preferences When Releas-
(thousand tons) ing Percentages of Buffer Stock 
are the Following; Total Averages 
70 80 90 
0 .94 .94 .93 2.81 .937 
100 .93 .91 .92 2.76 .920 
200 .90 .89 .91 2.70 .900 
Total 2.77 2.74 2.76 8.27 2.757 
Averages .923 .913 .920 2.756 .919 
percent increase in probability of meeting the import demands for the case 
of a greater beginning buffer stock. 
For a longer simulation time period, the probabilities of meeting 
ASEAN import preferences after six years were found to range between 0.74 and 
0.95 for zero level of beginning buffer stock (Tables 11, 12 and 13) or 
an average of 0.892 (Table 14), and between 0.88 and 0.94 for beginning 
buffer stock of 250,000 tons or an average of 0.919 (Table 15), only a 
2.7 percent increase for the greater level of beginning buffer stock. 
2. Sizes of buffer stock 
For six different sizes of buffer stock which ranges from zero to 
250,000 tons (0, 50,000, 100,000, 150,000, 200,000, and 250,000 tons), 
Tables 16 and 17 show that with beginning buffer stocks of zero, increas­
ing the size of buffer stock from nothing to 50,000 tons substantially 
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Table 11. Probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences in Year 6 
when beginning buffer stock is zero and releasing percentage 
is 70 
Minimum Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Thai-Others Import Preferences When Maximum Sizes of 
Exports Buffer Stocks are of the Following 
(thousand (thousand tons) 
Total Averages 
tons) 0 50 100 150 200 250 
0 .82 .93 .88 .94 .90 .92 5.39 .898 
100 .78 .92 .90 .94 .91 .92 5.37 .895 
200 .79 .90 .92 .88 .90 .90 5.29 .882 
Total 2.39 2.75 2.70 2.76 2.71 2.74 16.05 2.675 
Averages .797 .917 .920 .903 .913 5.35 .892 
Table 12. Probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences in Year 6 
when beginning buffer stock is zero and releasing percentage 
is 80 
Minimum Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Thai-Others Import Preferences When Maximum Sizes of 
Exports Buffer Stocks are of the Following 
(thousand tons) (thousand 
Total Averages 
tons) 0 50 100 150 200 250 
0 .82 .93 .92 .91 .94 .89 5.41 .902 
100 00
 
o
 
.92 .91 .92 .92 .90 5.37 .895 
200 .74 .92 .90 .90 .90 .91 5.27 .878 
Total 2.36 2.77 2.73 2.76 2,76 2.70 16.05 2.675 
Averages .787 .923 .910 .910 .920 .900 5.350 .892 
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Table 13. Probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences in Year 6 
when beginning buffer stock is zero and releasing percentage 
is 90 
Minimum Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Thai-Others Import Preferences When Maximum Sizes of 
Exports Buffer Stocks are of the Following 
(thousand 
Total Averages 
tons) 0 50 100 150 200 250 
0 .84 .88 .92 .93 .95 .92 5.44 .907 
100 .79 .91 .92 .92 .88 .88 5.30 .883 
200 .80 .91 .91 .89 .92 .90 5.33 .888 
Total 2.43 2.70 2.75 2.74 2.75 2.70 16.70 2.678 
Averages .810 .900 .917 .913 .917 .900 5.357 .893 
Table 14. Effects of minimum Thai-Other export and buffer stock 
releasing percentages in Year 6 when beginning buffer stock 
is zero 
Minimum Thai- Probabilities of Meeting Minimum 
Other Exports ASEAN Imports When Releasing Per-
(thousand tons) centages of Buffer Stocks Are; Total Averages 
70 80 90 
0 .898 .902 .907 2. 707 .902 
100 .895 .895 .883 2. 673 .891 
200 .882 .878 .888 2. 648 .883 
Total 2.675 2.675 2.678 8. 028 2.676 
Averages .892 .892 .892 2. 676 .892 
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Table 15. Effects of minimum Thai-Other Export and buffer stock 
releasing percentages in Year 6 when beginning buffer stock 
is 250,000 tons 
Minimum Thai- Probabilities of Meeting ISEAN 
Others Exports Imports Preferences When Releas-
(thousand tons) ing Percentages of Buffer Stock 
are the Following; Total Averages 
70 80 90 
0 .93 .95 .94 2 .82 .940 
100 .91 .92 .93 2, .76 .920 
200 .91 .88 .90 2, .69 .897 
Total 2.75 2.75 2.77 8, .27 2.757 
Averages .917 .917 .923 2, ,757 .919 
Table 16. Effects of buffer stock releasing percentages and sizes in 
Year 3 when beginning buffer stock is zero 
Buffer Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Stock Imports When Maximum Sizes of Buffer 
Releasing Stocks are of the Following; 
Percent- (thousand tons) 
Total Averages 
ages 0 50 100 150 200 250 
70 .757 .867 .870 .873 .870 .877 5.114 .852 
80 .760 .870 .863 .860 .897 .870 5.120 .853 
90 .793 .870 .873 .870 .873 .880 5.159 .860 
Total 2.310 2.607 2.606 2.603 2.640 2.627 15.393 2.565 
Averages .770 .869 .869 .868 .880 .876 5.132 .855 
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Table 17. Effects of buffer stock releasing percentages and sizes in 
Year 6 when beginning buffer stock is zero 
Buffer 
Stock 
Releasing 
Percent­
ages 
Probabilities of Meeting Minimum ASEAN 
Imports When Maximum Sizes of Buffer 
Stocks are of the Following: 
(thousand tons) 
50 100 150 200 250 
Total Averages 
70 .797 .917 .900 .920 .903 .913 5.350 .892 
80 .787 .923 .910 .910 .920 .900 5.350 .892 
90 .810 .900 .917 .913 .917 .900 5.357 .893 
Total 2.394 2.740 2.727 2.743 2.740 2.713 16.057 2.677 
Averages .798 .913 .909 .914 .913 .904 5.351 .892 
increases the probability of meeting ASEAN import preferences from 0.770 
to 0.869 (an increase of 9.9 percent) after three years, and from 0.798 to 
0.913 (an increase of 11.5 percent) after six years. 
Tables 16 and 17 also show that, in either three years or six years, 
increasing the size of the buffer stock from 50,000 tons to 250,000 tons 
does not result in any distinct increase in the probability of meeting ASEAN 
import preferences. 
3. Release percentages of buffer stock 
With a beginning buffer stock of zero, increasing the release percentages 
of buffer stock from 70 to 80 and 90 Increased the probabilities of meeting 
ASEAN Import preferences In three years from 0.52 to 0.853 and 0.860, re­
spectively (Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9), while in six years the probabilities 
were found to increase minutely from 0.892 to 0.893 (Tables 11, 12, 13, and 
14), a smaller probability increase than over the three-year run. 
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With a larger beginning buffer stock of 250,000 tons, Tables 1 and 
15 show that, in spite of the increase in probability magnitude for all 
three releasing percentages, the effects of the increase in such release 
percentages were found to be uncertain, for example, they decreased from 
0.923 to 0.913 and increased again to 0.920 for the three year case, and 
were 0.917, 0.917 and 0.923, respectively, for the six year case. 
4. Minimum export of Thai rice to others 
Unlike other parameters, the effects of increases in the minimum 
export of Thai rice to non-ASEAN countries were found to be quite steady. 
The average probabilities of meeting ASEAN import preferences were found 
to increase by approximately 1 to 2 percent for each 100,000 ton increase 
in minimum export of Thai rice to non-ASEAN markets. 
With a beginning buffer stock of zero, the average probabilities of 
meeting ASEAN import preferences for the minimum Thai-Other exports of 0, 
100,000 and 200,000 tons, were 0.869, 0.859 and 0.837, respectively, in 
the three years (Table 9) and 0.902, 0.891 and 0.883, respectively, in 
six years (Table 14). 
For the beginning buffer stock of 250,000 tons, the average probabilities 
were 0.937, 0.920 and 0.900, respectively in three years (Table 10) and 
0.940, 0.920 and 0.897, respectively, in six years (Table 15). 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Beginning Levels of the Buffer Stock 
Results from the simulation with the model indicate that if the ASEAN 
countries decided to start their international rice security program with 
the beginning buffer stock of 250,000 tons rather than with a zero begin­
ning buffer stock, the four net rice-importing countries of the ASEAN 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore) would likely be able to 
increase the chances of meeting their import preferences of Thai rice by 
6.4 percent over three years and 2.7 percent over six years. 
This implies that the longer the number of years, the less effective a 
higher beginning level of buffer stock would be. The problem is whether 
it is of worth to trade off the cost of having 250,000 tons of rice in 
tlic beginning of the buffer stock program for the greater innediate 
security. To provide a means of consideration for this issue a more elab­
orate study on the proper trade-off rate between the two would be needed. 
Further experiments with other levels of beginning buffer stock within 
the range of 0 and 250,000 tons, and with a maximum buffer stock raised 
as high as 500,000 tons, did not show any increase in the relative security 
indices. Therefore, if the average security probabilities of 0.855 over 
three years and 0.892 over six years are satisfactory to the ASEAN countries, 
they may wish to start their regional rice buffer stock with nothing in 
the storage and let the rice reserve stock accumulate through time and 
underlying conditions. 
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On the other hand, if member countries of the ASEAN do not feel 
secure enough to start out with zero stock, they may propose some partic­
ular amount of rice reserves to start with. This, however, may Induce 
other new problems, namely, in a particular time period some countries 
may not have enough rice to deposit in the initial reserves. Besides high 
prices of rice in the world market may signal the rice-exporting members 
to request delaying the program to some other time. The nonconformity of 
good and bad weather within the region could, at the same time, endow 
some with the readiness to contribute to the initial reserves while dis­
couraging others. 
To arrive at a more meaningful solution to the problem, a supplemental 
study on the economics of size of the beginning buffer stock would also 
be needed. 
B. Maximum Sizes of the Buffer Stock 
In this context, results obtained from the study give a hint that the 
maximum size of 50,000 tons for the rice buffer stock seems to be the 
optimal one since increasing the stock to a higher level than 50,000 tons 
did not show profound effect on the security indices. 
To many people, 50,000 tons as a maximum for the reserves seems to be 
quite low compared with the desired consumption of the member countries of 
the ASEAN. According to the study, the desired rice consumption for all 
people in the ASEAN region in 1978 was estimated as approximately 32.637 
million tons of which 50,000 tons is only 0.15 percent. Neither can the 
50,000 tons meet one day's rice consumption of the whole region which was 
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approximated at 90,000 tons. In addition, what was suggested for a world 
food reserve was the equivalent of 50 days of world consumption. To 
apply this rate of food reserve to the people of the ASEAN, they would 
require as much as 4.5 million tons of food in their security reserves. 
The reasons behind such a relatively small rice reserve for the ASEAN 
as indicated in the model studied are many. First, as given in the model, 
other ASEAN countries can also have access to the Thai private stocks 
the maximum of which was given at 1.5 million tons. Besides, this 1.5 
million tons of rice is also in excess over the 1.0 million tons pipeline 
level which will be released only for strategic purposes, say, the break­
out of war or other cases of comparable seriousness. 
Second, the model also allows the four rice-importing countries of 
the ASEAN to have access to rice exports from the rest of the world, the 
amount of which is stochastically identified by the model. The noncon­
formity of weather and relating cropping conditions around the world implies 
that the bad rice crops of the ASEAN may partly or wholly be soothed by 
the good rice crops of others. Even within the ASEAN region alone not 
all member countries were ever affected by the adverse climate to the same 
degree at the same time. Take the year 1977, for example. While rice 
crops of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were seriously affected by drought, 
that of the Philippines was at its peak and the Philippines exported rice 
for the first time after long years of being a rice importer. 
Third, problems may lie in the estimates of rice demand, production 
and trade used in the model. The reliability of data reported in both 
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the production yearbooks and the trade yearbooks of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) has been questioned by many. Technicians 
of some countries claimed thai: some FAO data were not the same as what 
were actually reported by them. Also, final adjustment of a country's 
data may not have been incorporated by the FAO and, hence, did not appear 
in the respective yearbooks. 
C. Release Percentages of the Buffer Stock 
As defined in the model, the release of rice from the regional rice 
buffer stock of the ASEAN can only be done if Thai rice production minus 
its domestic use plus rice exports from the rest of the world, and avail­
able Thai private stocks are short of both import demands by the ASEAN 
and non-ASEAN countries. The release, however, will be carried on only 
if there is some rice available in the buffer storage and the released 
amount is not beyond the specified percentage of the excess demand. 
Results of the study indicate that for the three release percentages 
under study, namely, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9, the higher release percentages tend to 
increase ASEAN rice security as expressed in terms of probabilities of 
meeting ASEAN import preferences. Nevertheless, such increases are very 
small most of the time and uncertain some of the time. 
The reason for not allowing the release of all that is needed and all 
that is available is that the second-stage security against disasters 
other than normal unfavorable climate like flood and drought, or a close 
repeat of such adverse climate should also be considered. The problem 
is to what extent should activities on such secondary security be carried 
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out as it can only be done at the cost of the first-stage security. The 
use of a higher release percentage implies that more consideration is placed 
on the first-stage security. A reduction of this percentage adds more 
to the security of the second stage. 
Following the idea given above, the reason behind the lesser effect 
of variation in the release percentages could be that their effects even 
out within the 200 replications of the six-year period of the simulation. 
To explain, the high release percentage which provides more security to 
the earlier years leaves less security for the later years and vice versa. 
D. Minimum Export of Thai Rice to Others 
As mentioned before, Thailand has long been the only rice-exporting 
country of the ASEAN. Through such a long history of international rice 
trade, Thailand has established a firm rice-trading relationship not only 
with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore, but also with other 
non-ASEAN countries like Hong Kong and some countries of the Middle East. 
Aside from normal trading relationships, other political and diplomatie 
reasons also call for the maintenance of Thai rice exports to the afore­
mentioned markets. 
Nevertheless, more favorable conditions should yet be given to the 
ASEAN countries. To conform with this idea, three minimum levels of Thai 
rice exports to the rest of the world were given and their effects studied. 
Results of the study in this context were found to be quite reasonable. 
For each 100,000 tons increase in the minimum Thai rice exports to others 
the ASEAN rice security in the form of probabilities of meeting ASEAN 
import preferences were reduced by 1 to 2 percent. 
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In reality it could be expected that, in spite'of its unfavorable 
effects on rice security of the ASEAN, Thailand could do no better than 
trying to maintain the 200,000 tons of rice exports to non-ASEAN countries, 
particularly Hong Kong and some Middle East countries. 
E. Needed Revisions for An Improved Model 
Truly speaking, this study of ASEAN rice security reserves is just 
the beginning of the story. As discussed earlier, there are quite a few 
areas of interest that were left untouched and are vulnerable to criticism. 
The leading and very delicate role of price was neglected in both 
the consumption and the production estimates used in the model. Needless 
to say as to how important price is, the model could have better reflected 
the truer behavior of both rice consumers and producers within the ASEAN 
region. An excuse for this neglect of the price mechanism is simple. Data 
collecting activities within the region have not been advanced enough to 
provide sufficient data for the derivation of theoretically accepted de­
mand and supply functions of rice. Besides the problem of the homogeneity 
of rice quality, there are still unsettled arguments concerning the char­
acteristics of the rice market. The world rice market has been viewed as 
being close to pure competition while others argued that it clearly 
was oligopolistic with the United States, China and Thailand being the 
three main suppliers [8]. 
A variety of rice policies, both within a country and among different 
countries, also bring forth a new dimension of difficulties. All in all, 
one can never neglect the role of price. The problem is how detailed 
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information concerning its role could be obtained. Once this is achieved, 
there would be no good excuse for not considering the role of price. 
Another area of interest that has not yet been considered in the 
model is the domestic rice stocks of other ASEAN countries besides Thailand. 
It would be quite unwise to believe that only Thailand and not other ASEAN 
countries carry domestic rice reserves. Prior to the meeting of the 
Working Group on Rice Security Reserves for the ASEAN in Bangkok during 
February 16-22, 1978, there has been no sign of available data concerning 
the domestic rice reserves of other ASEAN countries besides Thailand. 
The agreement on the exchange of all available data concerning rice 
stocks and related activities among the member countries of the ASEAN 
has paved the way for a better analysis of the subject, and hence, im­
proved guidelines on rice security reserves for the region as a whole. 
Finally, a closer and more sincere cooperation among all technicians 
and authorities of the participating nations of the ASEAN would shed more 
light on the complicated problems of international food reserves, not 
only for the ASEAN alone, but to other areas of the world as well. 
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V. SUMMARY 
The occurrence of the world's food crisis in 1974 has encouraged countries 
around the world to concentrate more on how to protect the world from 
possible catastrophes rising from food shortages. Four major factors, 
namely, population explosion, increases in the price of oil and its prod­
ucts, natural calamities, and depletion of world food stocks, were believed 
to be responsible for most of the current world food crisis. 
The World Food Council which was created with the aim of establishing 
food security for the entire world came up with a number of proposals, 
one of which was the world action on world food reserves. 
Startled by the same worldwide outbreak of food shortages and 
aroused by the world action on international food reserves, all five 
member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, 
eagerly expressed their positive views on the establishment of a food 
security reserve system within the region. 
Being the main staple of the ASEAN people, rice was unanimously 
selected as the first food item to start the regional food security pro­
gram. Having been the region's leading producer and exporter of rice, 
Thailand was asked to lead other countries of the ASEAN in the study that 
could shed more light on how to implement the program. With close cooper­
ation of the Iowa State University Sector Analysis Team in Thailand, this 
study was made with an aim to partially fulfill this requirement. 
88 
With time series data relating to rice production, consumption and 
trade, as well as population of all member countries of the ASEAN; per 
capita domestic disappearances were developed and 14 econometric equations 
including 5 population equations, 4 rice production equations, 4 net im­
port of rice equations, and 1 Thai-Others equation were obtained. Nine 
multivariate normal random variables were obtained from the nonpopulation 
equations and were added back to the relating equations such that they were 
embodied with stochastic power of estimation. 
Upon the attainment of all of the above, a computer program was 
written such that stochastic simulation of a hypothetical rice security 
scheme of the ASEAN could be pursued. With a set of parameters, namely, 
beginning Thailand private rice stocks of 1.32 million tons; beginning 
regional rice buffer stocks of 0 and 250,000 tons; maximum Thai private 
stocks of 1.5 million tons; maximum buffer stocks of 0, 50,000, 100,000, 
150,000, 200,000, and 250,000 tons; releasing percentages of buffer stock 
of 70, 80 and 90; ASEAN preference percentage of 90 and minimum Thai rice 
exports to non-ASEAN countries of 0, 100,000 and 200,000 tons; the model 
was run with 200 replications of a six-year duration. Results of the 
program were expressed in terms of country rice production, net imports 
from the rest of the world. Thai rice exports to non-ASEAN countries, 
per capita domestic disappearances, probabilities of meeting ASEAN import 
preferences, probabilities of meeting minimum Thai-Others exports, proba­
bilities that both the Thai private stock and the ASEAN buffer stocks 
become zero, and probabilities that both reach their maximum. Among all 
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the variables of interest, the effects of beginning buffer stock, sizes 
of the buffer stock, releasing percentages of the buffer stock, and min­
imum Thai-Others exports on the probabilities of meeting the ASEAN import 
preferences were traced. 
Results of the study show that the beginning buffer stock of 250,000 
tons when compared with that of zero ton tends to increase the probabil­
ities of meeting ASEAN import preferences by a greater magnitude in Year 
3 of the simulation than in Year 6. This calls for a supplemental cost 
study which could relate the cost of starting the food program with speci­
fied amounts of rice stock and the gaining chances of meeting the 
preferences. 
The relevant maximum size of the buffer stock found in the study 
was 50,000 tons. Possible answers to this low requirement of the buffer 
stock are, that besides rice from the buffer stock, the model also allows 
the ASEAN countries to have access to the Thai private stocks and rice 
exports from the rest of the world. 
Release percentages of the buffer stock were found insignificant in 
the study. It is believed that their effects even out from year to year 
of the study. 
Increases in minimum Thai rice exports to other countries besides 
the ASEAN were found to be steadily reducing the probabilities of meeting 
ASEAN import preferences by 1 and 2 percent for every 100,000 tons. How 
much should this minimum Thai rice export be depends on how much of such 
exports Thailand feels necessary to maintain for the sake of its trading 
and political relationships with others. 
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Finally, needed revisions for the improvement of this ASEAN rice 
security reserves model are believed to include more reliable data from 
the participating countries, the inclusion of the role of price in the 
demand and supply analysis and the consideration of other country stocks 
besides Thailand. Such would benefit not only the ASEAN but other coun­
tries of the world as well. 
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